


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UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS FORCES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

BY

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The term Unconventional Operations (UO) vice Special Operations (SO) will be introduced, defined and explained. The paper will clarify why Army Special Forces (SF) are a principle UO force and explain why the UO mission is critical. Most importantly, it will show why the numbered active duty Special Forces Groups (SFGs) should primarily focus on this mission and not be diverted to missions duplicated by other Special Operations Forces (SOF) or General Purpose Forces. Unconventional operations provide a realistic option for the uncertain future. Unconventional operations forces, focused and resourced, can provide a low risk option for the future as U.S. foreign policy continues to evolve. These unconventional operations forces can, and most likely will, play an increasingly active role around the world, especially during the next 10-30 years of global transition.

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UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS FORCES OF
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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United States Army
15 April 1993

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Project Adviser

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ABSTRACT

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The term Unconventional Operations (UO) vice Special Operations (SO) will be introduced, defined and explained. The paper will clarify why Army Special Forces (SF) are a principle UO force and explain why the UO mission is critical. Most importantly, it will show why the numbered active duty Special Forces Groups (SFGs) should primarily focus on this mission and not be diverted to missions duplicated by other Special Operations Forces (SOF) or General Purpose Forces. Unconventional operations provide a realistic option for the uncertain future. Unconventional operations forces, focused and resourced, can provide a low risk option for the future as U.S. foreign policy continues to evolve. These unconventional operations forces can, and most likely will, play an increasingly active role around the world, especially during the next 10-30 years of global transition.

UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS FORCES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

The purpose of this paper is to redefine the roles and missions of United States Army Special Forces. The term Unconventional Operations (UO) vice Special Operations (SO)¹ will be introduced, defined and explained. The paper will clarify why Army Special Forces (SF)² are a principle UO force and explain why the UO mission is critical. Most importantly, it will show why the numbered active duty Special Forces Groups (SFGs)³ should primarily focus on this mission and not be diverted to missions duplicated by other Special Operations Forces (SOF)⁴ or General Purpose Forces.⁵

BACKGROUND

Congressional legislation⁶ lead to the designation of certain Army, Navy and Air Force elements as core, vice augmenting, SOF. A brief description of these core Army, Navy and Air Force units follows:

Army

Special Forces: Special Forces are organized into groups of three battalions, each with one support company and three operational companies. Each company is composed of a headquarters element and six operational detachments of 12 personnel. SF units are regionally oriented to specific areas of the world and possess language training and cultural familiarity.⁷

Ranger Regiment: Rangers are organized into a regiment of three battalions. Battalions are organized into a headquarters company and three rifle companies, each composed of three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon.⁸ There are no CS/CSS units organic to the Ranger battalions.

Special Operations Aviation (SOA): SOA units are organized into both single aircraft type and composite battalions that provide a mix of light and medium lift and limited light attack capabilities.⁹

Special Support Unit: Special Support Units consists of

certain units designated to provide operational support to Army SOF. While these units usually support Special Mission Units, they are capable and have supported other Army SOF. Additionally, there are two other units in general support of Army SOF: the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion.

Navy

Sea-Air-Land Teams (SEALs): SEAL teams are organized into a headquarters element and operational platoons. Each team is usually composed of 10 operational platoons, each of which can be broken down into either 2 squads or 4 elements. All personnel are dive, parachute, and demolitions qualified.¹⁰

Special Boat Units (SBUs): SBUs are organized into a headquarters element and several combatant craft detachments, depending on number and type of vessels assigned.¹¹

SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams (SDVTs): Each SDV team is organized into a logistic support element, four SDV platoons, and two Dry Deck Shelter platoons.¹²

Air Force

An Air Force Special Operations Force organization will contain operational and command and control elements, as well as

maintenance, logistics, security, C3, intelligence, and selected facilities support.¹³

Special Mission Units (SMUs)

SMUs consist of units specifically organized for worldwide execution of the full spectrum of SO missions across the operational continuum. These units operate in sensitive environments which require rapid response with surgical application of a wide variety of unique skills. They specialize in maintaining a low profile of U.S. military involvement. These units normally operate in a classified and compartmented environment.

Other Associated Forces

Many other forces associated with SOF are not designated core SOF. Some of these include psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA) and certain designated Fleet Marine Forces, usually the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)]. Although not core SOF, the Army has organized PSYOP and CA units under the command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The MEU(SOC) is not a core SOF element and is not an assigned force under the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

Part of the Defense Authorization Bill of 1987, Public Law

99-661, Section 1311 (better known as the Nunn-Cohen Amendment) consolidated all core SOF under one unified command--the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCCOM). This controversial legislation was resisted by the Department of Defense. Full implementation of this legislation, and later clarifying acts, is not completed. The implementation process is on-going.

UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

SOF has become a popular term for a broad array of very diverse forces and organizations. The essence of SOF, the elements that contribute most significantly over the long term to the U.S. national security strategy in terms of the numbers of active missions and their effect on national security objectives, are the unconventional operations forces (UOF). Current doctrine does not identify these unconventional operations forces as specific, distinct forces. Furthermore, there is not a published definition of unconventional operations (UO) in Joint PUB 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. This paper provides a suggested definition for unconventional operations and identifies principal unconventional operations forces.

Unconventional operations are low visibility, economy of force and economy of resources operations. Unconventional operations are unique in that relatively small operational

elements work in a combined environment *with and through indigenous counterparts*. This environment is usually political sensitive, frequently requiring close cooperation with Department of State and other non-DoD agencies in remote locations across the operational continuum.

During peacetime, UO primarily consist of operations with nations that are important to U.S. national security strategy. Some examples of these operations are foreign internal defense operations, humanitarian assistance operations, nation building operations, counter-drug assistance and security assistance programs. During conflict or war, UO are primarily unconventional warfare operations. Examples of unconventional warfare operations are guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature.¹⁴ The above mentioned peacetime operations may continue during conflict as an economy of force effort, either within the operational and strategic area of operation (AOR) or in adjacent AORs. An example of the synergistic effect of this strategy is found in the recent experiences in the Arabian Gulf Conflict of 1991. While some U.S. Army Special Forces contributed to the effectiveness of coalition warfare in the AOR, other Special Forces elements conducted missions in Turkey, Africa, South/Central America and the Pacific and Asia.

These unconventional operations provide a low-risk political option with the potential of high levels of political return.

Conducted without fanfare, unconventional operations usually attract little, if any, media coverage.

UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS FORCES

This paper introduces Unconventional Operations Forces (UOF) as a new term. UOF are those United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) that are unique in their capability to conduct a wide range of unconventional operations, as opposed to those SOF elements whose SO missions are more narrow and specialized.

These unconventional roles consist primarily of teaching, training and organizing the military, paramilitary or other indigenous forces in the conduct of foreign internal defense operations, unconventional warfare, humanitarian assistance, nation building, counter-drug assistance, etc. These efforts focus on nations that are important to U.S. national security strategy. Best defined as forces principally organized and trained to accomplish their mission *through or by counterpart relationships with indigenous personnel*, UOF are unique. The only SOF specifically organized, trained and equipped to conduct these missions in this manner are the numbered Army Special Forces Groups.

HISTORY

During the mid-70's, in the post-Vietnam War era, Special Operations (SO) were severely curtailed. In those days, SO were not popular. In fact, the term Special Operations was little used. Few claimed to have anything to do with SO. The only Army organization associated with the term Special Operations was Special Forces (SF).

During these years, facing severe structure cuts and possible disestablishment, Special Forces embarked on a crusade for survival. In this post-Vietnam period, unconventional terminology was not popular. Army Special Forces began to downplay unconventional operations due to adverse association with Vietnam. Special Forces made an intense effort to convince critics that they had utility on the conventional battlefield.

Special Forces began to portray itself as a type of strike force that could fill gaps that existed in the general purpose force tactical commanders' force structure--primarily in deep (special) reconnaissance and deep attacks on enemy C3I (direct action). Special Forces became a very expensive (in rank and training) conventional force. The unconventional operations aspect of Special Forces remained only barely viable. Very little unconventional operations training continued during this period.

After the incident at Desert One in Iran, Congressional interest spurred Service interest in SO.¹⁵ By the mid-80's,

concurrent with relatively large Congressional funding, all the Services began revitalizing special organizations to secure a share of this increased funding. "Special Operations" and "Special Operations Capable" units began cropping up. Unfortunately, there was still little attention paid to the unconventional operations role. The new focus of Special Operations was counter-terrorism. The association with counter-terrorism was the role these new special operations players sought and, for the most part, still seek.

Entering the 90's, the world situation dramatically changed. Even as the USSR was dissolving, the enemies of the Cold War united, or at least cooperated, in the United Nations sanctioned war with Iraq. It is possible that we saw the trend for the future in the Saudi Arabian desert--coalition warfare with an element of unconventional operations.

Special Forces and other SOF teams conducted deep reconnaissance missions; but more significantly, most of the Special Forces teams conducted unconventional operations.¹⁶ Unfortunately, for the most part, these teams were ill-prepared.¹⁷

ROLES AND MISSIONS

According to *Joint Test Pub 3-05*, SOF have five principal missions and six collateral special operations activities. The definitions are found in the attached glossary at Annex A.

I. Principal missions

- (1) Unconventional Warfare (UW)
- (2) Direct Action (DA)
- (3) Special Reconnaissance (SR)
- (4) Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
- (5) Counter-terrorism (CT)

II. Collateral Special Operations Activities

- (1) Security Assistance (SA)
- (2) Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
- (3) Anti-terrorism and Other Security Activities
- (4) Counter-narcotics (CN)
- (5) Personnel Recovery
- (6) Special Activities

Several of these missions are, in reality, subsets of others. The introduction of unconventional operations precipitates combining several of these missions. By adding unconventional operations, the principal missions shrink to three, with several subsets. The following proposed changes better organize and clarify the SOF missions into functional areas.

I. Principal missions

- (1) Unconventional Operations (UO)
 - Unconventional Warfare (UW)
 - Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
 - Security Assistance (SA)
 - Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
 - Counter-Narcotics (CN)
- (2) Direct Action (DA)¹⁸
 - Counter-Terrorism (CT)
 - Personnel Recovery
- (3) Special Reconnaissance (SR)

II. Collateral Special Operations Activities

- (1) Special Activities
- (2) Anti-terrorism and Other Security Activities

The proposed changes categorize UW and FID as the primary elements of UO. Security assistance naturally becomes a subset of FID, as does humanitarian assistance. Personnel recovery becomes a subset of DA. Humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics are shown as subsets of foreign internal defense. There is also a role for SOF inside the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States (see Annex B, *Counter-Narcotics as Operations Other Than War*). This realignment of mission categories simplifies the training focus for units.

The following chart shows the SOF elements and their primary missions under current doctrinal publications.¹⁹ Chart 1 shows only the five principal mission areas--UW, FID, DA, SR, and CT.

Chart 1

SOF Missions

<u>Type Unit*</u>	<u>Primary</u>
Army	
Special Forces	UW, FID, DA, SR, CT
Rangers	DA, CT
SO Aviation	DA, SR, and Support all operations
Navy	
SEALS	DA, SR, CT, FID, UW**
SBU	Support all operations
SDVT	Support all operations

Air Force

Fixed-wing	Support all operations
Rotary-wing	Support all operations
SO Weather	Support all operations
SO CCT/PJ	Support all operations

Special Msn Units

DA, SR, CT, FID, UW

* USMC MEU(SOC) is not listed because this is not a core SOF element.

** Although the SEALs have UW as a mission, their definition is more like DA. They see UW as strikes/raids behind enemy lines unlike Army SF. Army SF practice UW in the traditional sense of working with indigenous elements in a denied area.

Much of the understanding of Special Forces' (SF) missions is limited to a relatively narrow view. Whereas, by doctrine, Special Forces has five primary missions--unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), special reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA), counter-terrorism (CT)--most attention focuses on three missions: counter-terrorism, direct action and special reconnaissance operations.

First, five missions are too many and result in a dilution of effort and resources. This is especially true considering DA, SR, and CT. Units usually approach these as stand-alone missions and train to execute them in a unilateral manner. Each mission then receives repetitive training time, consuming significant resources. Second, the three missions of counter-terrorism, special reconnaissance and direct action are missions other SOF or general purpose forces also have as missions. In the case of some units, they are better trained, organized and resourced than are the numbered Special Forces Groups. This is duplication we

can ill afford in these times of shrinking budgets.²⁰

Without a doubt, counter-terrorism must keep its high priority due to its political sensitivity, but as a subset of direct action. The probability that CT forces will be needed may have increased with the uncertainty facing the changing world. While some people believe terrorism is decreasing, history suggests this is unlikely.²¹ Regardless, terrorism is still a politically sensitive area. However, once again, there are other elements focused on this mission. The numbered Special Forces Groups should not be so tasked.²²

Unilateral direct action and special reconnaissance operations have always received disproportionate attention as Special Forces' missions. These are high visibility, immediate gratification missions, well within the comfort zone, and easily identified with by most people. The numbered Special Forces Groups can and do conduct these operations. They do so by sacrificing expertise and competence in unconventional operations. The capability to conduct a mission does not equate to competence. Again, other units and some General Purpose Force elements receive specific resourcing to train, equip and organize for these missions.²³ To consider the numbered Special Forces Group assets for unilateral DA and SR should be a last choice. Only if other units or general purpose forces are inappropriate or unavailable should the numbered Special Forces Groups receive DA or SR tasking--rather than being considered first. Numbered Special Forces Groups best conduct these missions through

coalition with indigenous assets.

The following chart shows the SOF elements and their proposed primary missions. The introduction of UO as a mission category--along with DA and SR--focuses the missions functionally. This chart shows only the proposed primary missions and not secondary, subordinate or collateral missions.

Chart 2

Proposed SOF Missions

<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Primary</u>
Army	
Special Forces	UO
Rangers	DA
SO Aviation	DA,SR and Support all operations
Navy*	
SEALS	DA,SR
SBU	Support all operations
SDVT	Support all operations
Air Force*	
Fixed-wing	Support all operations
Rotary-wing	Support all operations
SO Weather	Support all operations
SO CCT/PJ	Support all operations
Special Msn Units*	DA,SR

* Elements of these SOF organizations, on occasion, conduct FID, a portion of UO.

Army Special Forces' ability to conduct the broad range of unconventional operations described earlier in the paper is unique in the U.S. military. Certainly, other SOF elements and, on occasion, elements of the General Purpose Force execute portions of unconventional operations. However, only the

numbered Special Forces Groups, by virtue of their organization, training, equipment and orientation, are capable of covering the complete UO spectrum.

The uniqueness of unconventional operations lies in its cultural aspects. These cultural aspects apply equally to the requirements of teaching or the conduct of military operations. To conduct effective unconventional operations requires a detailed knowledge and understanding of the host nation's culture. Two key elements of this are language training and area studies. These are basic elements of a numbered Special Forces Group's training. Unfortunately, when one of these numbered Special Forces units focuses on a non-unconventional operations mission in response to a tasking, these are the first areas to suffer. To achieve adequate proficiency in these cultural aspects requires regional focus and intensive training. The conduct of UW or FID requires integrated proficiency in DA and SR. These areas are not ignored. They are only approached with a different training focus. The uniqueness of unconventional operations, as explained earlier, is in executing these missions in a combined environment, *by, through or in conjunction with foreign counterparts.*

Why care about focusing the SF mission on UO? Why not leave the missions as now assigned--UW, FID, DA, SR, CT?

The reason is resources. The prime resource being time. Currently, many of the numbered SF units (battalions and teams) strictly focus on DA, SR, or CT.²⁴ Accordingly, most of their

training time is spent perfecting their unilateral capabilities in these areas. They are able to spend very little time on the UO aspects. By so focusing on the DA, SR, or CT missions, these elements have lost the ability to be truly effective in the more complex activities of UO. They can not make the transition without significant effort and time. Likewise, units effectively trained in UO will not be able to transition rapidly to effective unilateral DA, SR or CT. These, too, are complicated missions requiring intensive training.

Too often many people confuse enthusiasm for competence. They also believe the potential to conduct a given mission equals the capability to execute it competently. This business requires a professional approach that appreciates the full extent of the missions' requirements and recognize limitations.

Critics can point out a shortfall in the capability of the overall force resulting from the proposal to delete special reconnaissance as a unilateral mission for the numbered SF Groups. This shortfall is in human intelligence (HUMINT) forward of the corps fire coordination line (FCL). Many commanders expect Special Forces to fill this role. This is an easy solution to their problem. If there are no other options, Special Forces may have to do this; however, this should not assume Special Forces will act unilaterally. If Unconventional Operations Forces are permitted to conduct peacetime, pre-conflict missions in their assigned regions, a secondary benefit may be the availability of indigenous assets. An effective and

efficient way of conducting HUMINT collection is through indigenous assets trained by the UOF. These assets might conduct missions unilaterally or be organized, trained, equipped and led by UOF. Unilateral collection is the method of last choice.

UO is a complex field that requires dedicated attention to achieve and maintain proficiency. To dilute and divert the efforts and resources of the numbered Special Forces Groups to CT, DA and SR as primary missions severely degrades the ability of these Groups to address adequately the UO role. The CT, DA and SR missions are better conducted by other units or the General Purpose Force elements so focused. It is unlikely shrinking budgets can accept this duplication in the future.

Unfortunately, the SOF community, DoD and Congress seem fixated on the CT, DA and SR missions. These are highly visible missions and receive most of the attention and resourcing. Unconventional operations missions are almost an afterthought. Many people seem to have forgotten the "routine and not so glamorous" unconventional operations which in fact contribute most to U.S. national security strategy in terms of the numbers of missions conducted and their effect on national security objectives.²⁵

President Bush stated in the January, 1993, National Security Strategy of the United States that "Through a strategy of engagement and leadership, we seek:

Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress. To this end, we have four mutually supportive goals that guide our overall national

security efforts. These are protecting the United States and its citizens from attack; honoring, strengthening, and extending our historic, treaty and collective defense arrangements; ensuring that no hostile power is able to dominate or control a region critical to our interests; and, working to avoid conflict by reducing sources of regional instability and violence, limiting the proliferation of advanced military technology and weapons of mass destruction, and strengthening civil-military institutions while reducing the economic burdens of military spending"²⁶

Unconventional Operations Forces have a significant, if not leading, role to play in implementing these national security efforts.

Indications are the world of the 90's, and likely beyond, will probably be much more unstable than the one of the 80's. The control and relatively enforced stability of the bipolar world of the 70's and 80's has given way to a growing concern by numerous nations about their national security.²⁷ The stage is set for increasing regional instability. The role that the U.S. is to play in this unstable environment is unclear. One "means" that is available, though in need of attention, is through unconventional operations. UO, prudently and judiciously executed, can provide for regional stability through low-level U.S. presence. This presence can act as a brake on regional ambitions.

Nations that see or benefit from these unconventional operations may become more convinced and assured of U.S. interest

in and concern for a given region. This presence can foster diplomacy, whereas absence may foster conflict. Nations or regions that perceive themselves adrift from or outside the sphere of concern of the world's only super-power, may feel compelled to pursue their own independent means of national security. This can exacerbate regional arms races, possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional instability.

U.S. foreign policy is in transition. It is unclear what vision will emerge from the Clinton administration. With this administration's early focus on domestic affairs, there can be no doubt it is sending mixed signals to the rest of the world. Our current foreign policy seems to be reactive vice proactive. This is not surprising. At best, it is difficult to anticipate world and regional events. Samuel Huntington² describes it thus:

All in all, the emerging world is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the Cold War and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities.

Unconventional operations can provide a window through which this "jungle-like world" can be viewed with greater clarity. This is the arena, the regionally focused arena, within which unconventional operations forces thrive and can, if properly and timely employed, provide a unique option in executing of the national security strategy of the U.S.

RECOMMENDATIONS

First, codify in doctrine the terms unconventional operations (UO) and unconventional operational forces (UOF). As a distinct element of SOF, recognize UOF as key implementers of national security strategy.

Secondly, the primary mission for active component numbered Army Special Forces Groups must be unconventional operations. Either eliminate or clearly state DA, SR and CT as duplicative subordinate missions for the numbered Special Forces Groups. Clearly indicate that other SOF or general purpose force elements are more appropriately tasked for these missions. Unconventional operations require intense focus. Diversion of training time and resources to missions performed by other elements is an unjustifiable duplication.

Finally, and most important, get the numbered Special Forces Groups' units actively involved outside the United States to open these "windows" and help provide insight into these areas. This will assist with regional stability. To do this adequately will require some change to the current structure, funding and employment of the SF battalions. The strength of Special Forces is in their cultural focus. We must capitalize upon this strength.

To accomplish this, significantly increase funding and priority for unconventional operations. Ensure regional orientation and funding for the UOF to operate as much as

possible in their respective regions. Give the fifteen active Special Forces battalions clear areas (regions) of responsibility that remain fixed. It takes a long time, sometimes years, to cultivate an area and inculcate regional expertise in a unit. An Unconventional Operations Force cannot change its language and region every few years and be expected to develop any significant degree of expertise or understanding of a region.

These areas must be carefully selected based on world dynamics and not based on current force structure. This means identify the regions and allocate (vice apportion) the battalions, then determine the headquarters structure at SF Group level. This may mean that one theater may have seven battalions oriented on sub-regional areas and ethnic groups, while another theater may require five battalions and a third theater three battalions.

Concurrently, make the SF battalions more organizationally independent, even at the expense of the SF Group support structure. Attached at Annex C is a proposed table of organization for a Special Forces battalion. Evolved during a two year test by the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa, it proved viable in an unconventional operations environment.

The current SF Group headquarters structure will probably require modification. Some structure should be moved to the battalions. Conversely, no matter how much the battalions' structure increases, the SF Group must have assets available to

augment or weight a battalion in a given scenario. Another consideration is to move the Group headquarters into the theaters and make them the Army component headquarters for the CINC's Special Operations Commands. The focus of UOF activity will be the battalion, not the SF Group.

The advantages of this are obvious. The United States gains regional experts with on-the-ground experience, able to help obviate Huntington's "jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities." Additionally, this provides for mutual trust and understanding through personal and sustained contact with regional personalities. This can easily be the most important outcome of the long-term regional orientation. In most of the developing nations, personal relationships are the key to trust and understanding. Who you are personally is more important than what you represent. UOF can develop these relationships and facilitate the critical interface between coalition forces in a conflict as in DESERT SHIELD/STORM. UOF, sufficiently resourced, can maintain a forward presence that can reassure nervous nations and increase regional stability. Furthermore, in the event of an incident or even conflict, these elements then provide a ready source of first-hand regional expertise.

Unconventional operations provide a realistic option for the uncertain future. Unconventional operations forces, focused and resourced, can provide a low risk option for the future as U.S. foreign policy continues to evolve. However, significant

attention and resources must be focused on these unconventional operations forces. These unconventional operations forces can, and most likely will, play an increasingly active role around the world, especially during the next 10-30 years of global transition.

ENDNOTES

1. Special Operations (DOD): [Joint Pub 1-02]: Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible.
2. United States Army Special Forces (DOD): [Joint Pub 1-02]: Military personnel with cross training in basic and specialized military skills, organized into small, multi-purpose detachments with the mission to train, organize, supply, direct, and control indigenous forces in guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency operations, and to conduct unconventional warfare operations.
3. There are several Special Forces organizations. The numbered Special Forces Groups form the core of Special Forces. In the active component, these are the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 10th Special Forces Groups. In the reserve component, the numbered SF Groups are the 11th, 12th, 19th and 20th. This paper will only address the active component. The roles and missions of the reserve component groups requires analysis outside the scope of this paper. Other non-numbered Special Forces units include SFOD-D (Delta Force) and Training Group of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School at Ft. Bragg, NC.
4. Special Operations Forces (SOF): [Test PUB, Joint PUB 3-05, Doctrine For Joint Special Operations, Oct 90, pg II-1]: Those forces specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct or support SO primary and collateral missions as herein described. These missions are not the sole purview of designed SOF. Under certain circumstances, conventional non-SO forces may provide the capabilities required to conduct a specific special operation. However, designated SOF are principally structured to be the force of choice under most circumstances. They possess unique capabilities to address those missions, regardless of where they are conducted in the operational continuum.
5. General purpose forces and conventional forces are used interchangeably. According to Joint Test Pub 3-05, Oct 90, also those forces not specifically trained, equipped, and organized to conduct special operations. Conventional forces: Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02).

6. United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 99th Congress--Second Session 1986 (St Paul: West Publishing Co., 1987) v. 6, 6593-6599.

7. Joint Test Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct 1990), A-1.

8. Ibid., A-4.

9. Ibid., A-5.

10. Ibid., B-1.

11. Ibid., B-5.

12. Ibid., B-4.

13. Ibid., C-1.

14. Unconventional Warfare (DOD): [Joint Pub 1-02]: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace.

15. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations Review Group, Rescue Mission Report, August 1980. This is known as the Holloway Commission Report. Its purpose was to conduct a broad examination of the planning, organization, coordination, direction and control of the Iranian hostage rescue mission. The failed rescue attempt and the subsequent Congressional interest lead directly to the legislation creating the United States Special Operations Command.

16. Unconventional operations were conducted by both the 5th and 10th Special Forces Groups. In Saudi Arabia, the 5th SFG conducted training for the Kuwait brigades, placed liaison and coordination teams with the Egyptian and Saudi units, and conducted some deep reconnaissance missions. They were also involved in unconventional warfare operations. In Turkey, the 10th SFG conducted humanitarian assistance with the Kurds.

17. Prior to DESERT SHIELD/STORM the 5th SFG prepared its detachments in accordance with its OPLANs/CONPLANs. These taskings designated FID priority one and SR as priority two. It was believed that the detachments could easily shift between the

two. This did not prove to be true. They did not have the proper weapons and equipment to adequately conduct the SR mission. Initially, they were unprepared to conduct any mission beyond FID (in which they excelled as key to the coalition effort). A concerted effort obtained the needed equipment, but the training time could not be recovered.

18. Direct Actions missions may be conducted as part of unconventional operations such as unconventional warfare and counter-narcotics, but the desire is that these missions be combined operations if possible.

19. Joint Test Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct 1990).

20. The Rangers are an excellent direct action unit, but do not like to be employed in less than battalion size elements although in some cases will execute company size operations. The Navy SEAL Tms are excellent at small direct action and reconnaissance operations, but are limited to coastal and riverine areas. Special Mission Units are specifically trained to conduct all missions: CT, DA, SR and limited FID and UW. The general purpose force has reconnaissance units to conduct the tactical recon missions.

21. Walter Laqueur, first in his monumental works Guerrilla, 1976 and Terrorism, 1977, and again in his update to Terrorism, his book, The Age of Terrorism, 1987, makes the point that terrorism is a tactic to effect political change and has been used over the centuries by disaffected and politically impotent segments of society. Terrorism is a tactic closely associated with insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. As political phenomenon, they are not mutually exclusive of each other. The future, reflected in the post Cold War realities, suggests insurgency and terrorism will occur with increasing regularity.

22. CT proficiency requires intense effort to become truly surgical. However, the CT mission given to SF is an *in-extremis* mission. If honestly approached in this manner, and not as a *de facto* duplication of the principle CT forces, then this mission is only a DA mission. Obviously, the degree of risk increases.

23. Some examples are: the Special Mission Units, the Special Support Units, the Rangers, Divisional and Corps recon units, the SEALs. None of these units are focused on UO.

24. The 7th SFG is probably an exception to this generality. Of all the Special Forces Groups, the 7th SFG is most oriented to UO.

25. Special Forces elements have been training with their counterparts in many nations around the globe for many years. Through their presence in these countries, relationships and contacts have been established that have had far reaching effects. In many of these countries, the military counterparts with whom Special Forces have worked have eventually risen to various positions of power--in some cases even Head-of-State. These relationships have lead to regional stability in some cases and access to critical facilities in others. In almost all cases, SF is viewed in these countries as informal ambassadors of the U.S. and positive examples of democracy. The leverage gained in negotiations with foreign governments over our national security goals and objectives often staggers the imagination of the casual observer. For example, if one accepts that one of our goals in Liberia was to gain and maintain the trust and confidence of its leader, President Doe, then the efforts of a single Special Forces sergeant met and exceeded expectations. There are other operations, usually classified, where Special Forces soldiers accomplishments far exceeded anything thought possible in terms of the long term positive impact on U.S./allied relations.

26. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1993) 3.

27. During the Cold War, these countries enjoyed relative national security due to the competition between the USSR and U.S. Neither super-power would permit tangible threats to their respective satellites, surrogates or friends. Without super-power influence, these nations may now pursue regional ambitions or may perceive threats from their now unconstrained neighbors.

28. Samuel Huntington is an Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

ANNEX A

GLOSSARY

anti-terrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)

collateral mission activity. Missions, other than those for which a force is principally organized, trained, and equipped, that can be accomplished by virtue of the inherent capabilities of that force. For Special Operations Forces, these activities include humanitarian assistance, security assistance, personnel recovery, counter-narcotics, anti-terrorism, and other security activities. (Joint Test Pub 3-05, Oct 90)

convention: General agreement on or acceptance of certain practices or attitudes; a practice or acceptance of certain practices or attitudes. [The American Heritage Dictionary, 2d College Ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982).]

conventional: Developed, established, or approved by general usage; conforming to established practice or accepted standards. [The American Heritage Dictionary, 2d College Ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982).]

conventional forces. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)
General purpose forces and conventional forces are used interchangeably. According to Joint Test Pub 3-05, Oct 90, also those forces not specifically trained, equipped, and organized to conduct special operations.

counter-terrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct action mission. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions principally taken by Special Operations Forces to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specific target; or to destroy, capture, or recover designed personnel or material. In the conduct of these operations, Special Operations Forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. Also called DA. (Joint Test Pub 3-05, Oct 90)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the actions programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to mitigate the results of a natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions by helping to reduce human pain, disease, suffering, hunger, hardship, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or agencies that have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JSCP, Annex L)

in extremis. A situation of such exceptional urgency that immediate action must be taken to minimize imminent loss of life or catastrophic degradation of the political or military situation. (Joint Test Pub 3-05, Oct 90)

internal development. Actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and social) that respond to the needs of its society. (Joint Pub 1-02)

low intensity conflict. Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low Intensity Conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low Intensity Conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC. (Joint Pub 1-02). New joint terminology now calls this "Operations Other Than War."

low visibility operations. Sensitive operations wherein the political/military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Sea-Air-Land Team. A group of officers and individuals specially trained and equipped for conducting unconventional and paramilitary operations and to train personnel of allied nations in such operations including surveillance and reconnaissance in and from restricted waters, rivers, and coastal areas. Commonly referred to as SEAL team. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance. Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special activities. Activities conducted in support of foreign policy objectives that are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in support of such activities but are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions. (Joint Test Pub 3-05, Oct 90)

special air operations. An operation, conducted at any level of conflict, in support of unconventional warfare and clandestine, covert and psychological activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special mission unit (SMU). A generic term to represent a group of operations and support personnel from designated organizations that is tasked-organized to perform a specific mission. Often used to describe highly classified activities. (Joint Test Pub 3-05, Oct 90)

special operations (SO). Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations forces (SOF). Those forces specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct or support SO primary and collateral missions as herein described. These missions are not the sole purview of designed SOF. Under certain circumstances, conventional non-SO forces may provide the capabilities required to conduct a specific special operation. However, designated SOF are principally structured to be the force of choice under most circumstances. They possess unique capabilities to address those missions, regardless of where they are conducted in the operational continuum. (Joint Test Pub 3-05, Oct 90)

special reconnaissance operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and

activities of an actual or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, or demographic characteristics of a particular area. These operations include target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. Also called SR. (Joint Test Pub 3-05, Oct 90)

strategic mission. A mission directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity and his will to make war. Targets include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communications facilities, and other such target systems. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are designed to have a long range, rather than immediate, effect on the enemy and its military forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace. Also called UW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

United States Army Special Forces. Military personnel with cross training in basic and specialized military skills, organized into small, multi-purpose detachments with the mission to train, organize, supply, direct, and control indigenous forces in guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency operations, and to conduct unconventional warfare operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unconventional: not adhering to convention; out of the ordinary. [The American Heritage Dictionary, 2d College Ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982).]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS AS OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

How can we win the "war" on drugs? We first must realize it is truly a conflict--a fight. Then we must be willing to employ all the elements of national power--economic, informational, political and military--both within as well as outside the United States.

Counter-narcotics is a conflict--an operation other than war. With the end of the Cold War, illegal drugs (narcotics)¹ are the most serious threat to our national security. Sadly, counter-narcotic efforts to-date have been mostly unsuccessful.

The reason for our lack of success is plain. We have not made a true national commitment to address this issue as a threat to our national security. The American citizenry is not yet willing to pay the price for victory. The American people want the "good life" without sacrifice.² Until this general attitude changes, we will not win this conflict.

THE CONFLICT

This conflict is difficult to qualify. Categorizing it as insurgency/counterinsurgency qualifies it best. Using old terminology, this is a low intensity conflict. A quick review of the key tenets of low intensity conflict is necessary. The book, *Uncomfortable Wars*, edited by Max Manwaring, provides an excellent analysis. Drawing somewhat from Clausewitz, the book addresses a trinity of the government, enemy and the populace. It shows the societal dimension, the populace, as the center of gravity in these conflicts. The government and the enemy compete for the support of the populace. Legitimacy of the effort and willingness of the populace to endure, pursue and support the effort are the most important factors.³

The book draws from an impressive collection of empirical data collected on many cases since World War II. It identifies a core of six general areas critical to the success or failure of these conflicts.⁴ These areas are:

1. Legitimacy. This means legitimacy in all areas. Legitimacy of the government and the operational instruments used to conduct the fight are as important as the legitimacy of the cause and the illegitimacy of the enemy.

2. Unity of effort. Somebody must be in overall charge with the power to direct the effort. Much less desirable, but theoretically workable, co-equal groups unite in common, cooperative effort to achieve the goal. Currently, of the many different U.S. agencies working in counter-narcotics, no one agency is empowered to direct the overall effort and there is considerable disharmony.

3. Type and consistency of external aid to the government. For the U.S., this is the support and help from other nations to cooperate in this effort. For these other nations, it is the

ANNEX B

COUNTER-NARCOTICS AS OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

by

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24 February 1993

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support and help from the United States. Although these other nations need some military support, socio-economic assistance is of supreme importance.

4. Level of competence and discipline of operational instruments. This includes the police, armed forces and the intelligence apparatus used in the conflict--both at home and abroad, in the U.S. and in other nations. Corruption is a key concern.

5. Ability to reduce outside support to the enemy. Demand in the U.S. is the key external aid to the drug traffickers. External aid also includes both active and passive support. Apathy of Americans provides additional external support to the drug traffickers, as does the support of the indigenous populace in the drug producing countries. Comparatively, material support is easy to identify.

6. Intelligence. The drug conflict is an intelligence conflict. Everything from spies and double agents to satellites are used. It is impossible to win this conflict without accurate, timely intelligence. The side that has the best intelligence, and uses the information, will win.

As Manwaring cautions, these are all interrelated. Inappropriate attention to just one of these areas almost always results in failure of effort.

A NEED

To address successfully the drug issue, the American public must accept the true nature of the threat. We must declare war in fact and not in rhetoric. We are still treating the drug issue as a police action, when it is an assault on our national security.⁵ Counter-drug efforts are not focused, integrated, unified, nor efficient. This inefficiency is characterized by the large number of different agencies involved in counter-narcotics.⁶ This is the peak of sub-optimization. We require a true declaration of war. However, the American people have yet to demand this of the government or of themselves.

Now, let's assume that the American populace supports a true war on drugs. What are some of the measures required? First, we must formulate a national counter-narcotics campaign plan that incorporates all elements of national power. An excellent proposal on how to address the supply side is found in Campaign Planning and the Drug War by Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel.⁷ Unfortunately, little is said about the demand side. Anything less than total national commitment, focused by an integrated campaign plan, will continue to doom us to failure.

THE PLAN

This paper provides an approach for a successful counter-narcotic campaign. This campaign continues attacking the supply side of the issue, as addressed by Munger and Mendel, but the focus of effort and resources is on attacking the demand. We will employ all the elements of national power--informational, political, economic and military.

INFORMATIONAL

Success depends on winning the informational campaign. This is the fight for the hearts and minds of the American populace--the societal dimension. This is tantamount to a psychological operation conducted within the U.S. as well as outside the country. We will use all forms of informational methods to energize the populace. The American people must be made truly aware of the impact illegal drugs are having, and will have in the future, on our national security.

Illegal drugs are an insidious attack on the very roots of our country. Drugs are destroying the nation--its future. Directly or indirectly, illegal drugs continue to damage every facet of our society. Second and third order effects of drugs are visible everywhere. Drugs contribute to moral decay, reduced productivity, increased crime, grid-locked courts, welfare, homelessness, disease, soaring health costs, disruption at schools, and on and on.

Demand reduction is the only long-term solution. The American people must realize the drug problem is of our making. We cannot ignore the supply side of the issue. Supply creates its own demand. We must continue interdicting the flow and supply of these drugs from outside the country, but the real battle is at home. It serves only the drug traffickers to blame the problem on other nations, such as Columbia and Peru. This only hurts unity of effort.

The American people must be convinced the real war is at home. It will take wartime sacrifices to win it--sacrifices no less extreme than those imposed by President Lincoln during the Civil War or those directed by Roosevelt during World War II.⁸ The success and severity of these sacrifices will depend on how much the American people believe in the legitimacy of the effort.

POLITICAL

We need aggressive political (legislative, judicial and executive) action to establish unity of effort.⁹ Under the plan being proposed, a single agency will be in charge of the total campaign, both within and outside the United States. This will

not be the ineffective Office of National Drug Control Policy.¹⁰ Since ultimately the courts must adjudicate drug cases and follow basic rules of evidence, the Department of Justice (DOJ) must be in command. All other agencies, by Presidential Executive Order, will be in support on demand. This includes, among others, Department of State (DOS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DOD) and all state and local governments and agencies.

Next, we will increase law enforcement manpower significantly at all levels--national, state and local. This is a vital element. Once, where there were three enforcement personnel for every major crime, now there are two major crimes for every law enforcement agent.¹¹ Crime has increased, but the problem is mostly a result of a reduced number of police as a percentage of the population.¹² Obviously, this increase of police incurs a significant public cost that will undoubtedly require tax increases at all levels. This goes back to the informational campaign and convincing the public of the necessity.

Part of this increase in police will be towards establishing a national counter-narcotics police force. Organized under the Department of Justice, this force will be empowered to direct and police all counter-drug operations nationally and internationally. This force will be authorized to cross all jurisdictional lines from federal through state and local law enforcement.

We also will make the legal process more efficient. This may require a return to a more conservative interpretation of certain constitutional rights. We must depend on Congress to do this correctly. Congress and the courts must free the enforcement agencies from the laws that now only help the drug traffickers.¹³ However, these suspensions cannot be *carte blanche* nor cavalierly given. We cannot sacrifice the constitution in order to try to save it.

Drug cases will receive priority prosecution. Stricter federal laws governing illegal drugs will be enacted, possibly including the death penalty for drug dealers. Additionally, the penal system will be revised to pay for itself. Offenders will stop getting a free ride at taxpayers expense. Criminals will be put to work to pay for the penal system. Hard, productive work is the best rehabilitative tool. This is entirely feasible through the repeal of certain laws enacted during the liberal excesses of the 60's.¹⁴

ECONOMIC

Next, economic pressure will be brought to bear on any nation that does not support the war on drugs. Many economic tools are available. Most importantly, however, economic

assistance is critical to those nations that support the effort in a real sense.¹⁵

We must realize that in several key nations, the narco-economy provides otherwise unattainable income for many underprivileged. This income far surpasses anything the national government can provide, especially in the short term. Many of the drug producing (supply) countries are troubled with long term social and economic issues that have repressed a majority of the population for decades, if not centuries. There is endemic poverty and maldistribution of wealth. These issues are slowly being addressed in most of these countries, but some, Columbia and Peru for example, are in a struggle for national survival. It is possible we may see an elected narco-government in one or both of these countries--a narcodemocracy.

We will focus our economic assistance at helping these nations solve their social ills. The most significant area is the endemic poverty. We must help legitimize these government by helping them help their people. This is the only long-term solution. The building of a large, educated middle class is the only path to a true democracy. We must help these nations enfranchise citizens. In many of these countries, the people are inhabitants, not citizens. In an article in *Foreign Policy* magazine, Tina Rosenberg put it this way:

A country has a citizenry when its poorest and least powerful residents believe that the government is theirs; poor and rich alike feel that they are part of the country in which they live, by whose rules they abide. Citizens believe the political system offers them a voice and a way to satisfy basic needs. In a citizenry, law is more important than power. The government is strong not because of its size, but because it has popular legitimacy.¹⁶

MILITARY

Finally, as mentioned above, the military will be completely involved in the war, both within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States and overseas. This is a war. The military must be a key participant. The use of the military within the U.S. must be authorized, even if, at times, executive use of *posse comitatus* is necessary.¹⁷ Remember, this is a war and the military is the national element designed to fight wars. The military currently is the only agency with the resources, command and control, and technology to match the enemy.¹⁸

The counter-narcotics conflict is very much a "war in the shadows." As such there is little utility in large formations or

massive military might. In its new role, DOJ can task the Secretary of Defense for support. Within DOD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) should have the lead with the mission of coordinating the military portion of the campaign plan and of coordinating military participation, both conventional and unconventional. USSOCOM will be a key participant. This participation would be under the direction of the DOJ and would include operations both within and outside the U.S.

USSOCOM has many unique characteristics in organization, forces, training, thinking and attitude that makes it a logical DOD agency for the counter-narcotics conflict. First, it is a joint force that routinely trains and operates in combined operations with other nations' military and paramilitary forces. As such, working relationships are already established with other governmental agencies and other nations' governments and militaries. Second, the force has highly skilled and trained individuals who are older and more mature than those of regular army units. Of added importance, USSOCOM personnel routinely operate in politically sensitive environments.

Additionally, the military in general, and USSOCOM in particular, have available significant "leading-edge" technology and capability. These far exceed that which currently is available to civilian enforcement agencies. The enemy (drug traffickers) are not as limited as the police. With their unlimited narco-dollars, they purchase weapons, intelligence and technology superior to that which the law enforcement agencies are able to afford. This advantage will be nullified. Military state-of-the-art technology and capability is absolutely necessary to take the campaign to the enemy, both in the U.S. and overseas.

USSOCOM forces also can take the war to the enemy in the form of unconventional warfare. Infiltration, sabotage, subversion and guerrilla warfare are all means that may be employed successfully, even within the United States. We will take the initiative from the enemy. Interdiction and direct action strike operations (covert, if necessary) against enemy centers of gravity will help take the initiative from the enemy. Combined with a psychological operations campaign and civil-military operations, popular support for the narcotic traffickers can be eroded and supplanted with governmental support both at home and abroad. This is an unconventional war and unconventional forces and methods must be used to fight it.

When the national narcotics police organization matures, the military will move even more into the background. Even prior to this, the military will always remain subject to strict civilian control. The military will not conduct unilateral operations. Overall civilian control is an essential element--even in the day-to-day operations.¹⁹

THE SIX TENETS

In revisiting the six tenets mentioned earlier, we can check on the possibility of success of our plan.

1. Legitimacy. The illegitimacy of illegal drug trafficking in the United States is well established. However, this is not true in some of the supply nations. Endemic poverty and maldistribution of wealth make narco-dollars very attractive. If we cannot help these nations' governments establish their legitimacy and enfranchise their citizens, we will have great difficulty winning this war. This plan stresses socio-economic assistance.

2. Unity of effort. Consolidation of the total counter-drug effort under the Department of Justice solves this issue. Obviously, other agencies can subvert this unity with less than full cooperation.

3. Type and consistency of external aid to the government. This plan provides for this, but the issue will always be consistency. The will of the American populace to endure long-term is key and always doubtful.

4. Level of competence and discipline of operational instruments. This is linked to legitimacy. The use of police and, especially, the military, must be legitimate to the people. Additionally, the actions of these instruments in performing their missions is critical. Restraint, prudence and competence are a must.

5. Ability to reduce outside support to the enemy. This, possibly even more than legitimacy, is the key to success. Demand must be curtailed and controlled. One opinion is that this will take at least two generations. Starting now with pre-school aged children, through focused education, we may break the cycle of demand. It is not cost effective to concentrate on current users. Even though we will not concede the fight against supply, the vast amount of effort and resources will be focused on demand reduction.

6. Intelligence. This plan provides for intelligence collection and use. Focusing the efforts of all intelligence agencies--DOJ, CIA, FBI, DIA, and DOD--provides everything from basic HUMINT to sophisticated technologic methods and means. The key to intelligence is accuracy, integration and timeliness.

We have the resources, the technology and the ability to win this war. We have the legitimacy of cause and the knowledge of what needs to be done. Do we, as a nation, have the will?

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, this proposal does not stand the test of the assumptions. We have neither the leadership nor the political will in Congress to rally the American people to support such a

proposal. We will continue to apply band-aids to the increasing cuts of the insidious illegal drug razor. We are hemorrhaging. We are running out of time. We must soon recognize the threat for what it is and be willing to make the necessary sacrifices. If we don't, we will either slowly bleed to death as a nation, or, when we are finally driven to action by the pain, we will find ourselves too weakened and subverted to save the nation.

For the Romans did in these cases what all wise princes should do, who consider not only present but also future discords and diligently guard against them; for being foreseen they can easily be remedied, but if one waits till they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the malady has become incurable...Therefore, the Romans, observing disorders while yet remote, were always able to find a remedy, and never allowed them to increase in order to avoid war; for they knew that war is not to be avoided, and can be deferred only to the advantage of the other side....²⁰

ENDNOTES

1. The terms narcotics/drugs, counter-narcotics/counter-drugs are used interchangeably, meaning illegal narcotics.
2. In truth, because of illegal drugs, many Americans not only don't have the "good life," they in fact live a very miserable life with little hope for the future.
3. Max Manwaring, ed., Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 15-16. Note that Clausewitz's trinity consisted of the government, the people, and the army.
4. Ibid., pp. 38-41.
5. Uri Ra'anan et al., Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism (Washington: Lexington Books, 1986), 164-166, 193, 330.
6. Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA., Feb. 1991). Chapter 2 describes the various agencies working in counter-narcotics. There are 14 federal agencies directly involved in law enforcement and numerous other agencies involved in some manner. Depending on how these agencies are counted, the total number can exceed 50.
7. Ibid.
8. Don T. Phillips, Lincoln on Leadership: Executive Strategies for Tough Times (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1992), 88; Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 417.
9. Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, Who Will Win? A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War (New York: Taylor and Francis New York Inc., 1989), 39-41.
10. Raphael F. Perl, "United States Andean Drug Policy: Background and Issues for Decisionmakers," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Fall 1992, V.34, N.3, 24-25.
11. Ted Gest, "The selling of an alluring concept," U. S. News and World Report, January 25, 1993, 67.
12. The source of this information was a guest speaker at the USAWC.

13. An example of a more conservative interpretation of constitutional rights is with the Fourth Amendment. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures needs a more conservative interpretation. The current interpretation of unreasonable handicaps enforcement agencies, especially when dealing with a liberal judge. Likewise, the Eighth Amendment concerning bail must have much higher floors for drug traffickers, because of the vast amounts of money they have, even in the billions of dollars.

14. This does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment. The liberal interpretation currently attached to this amendment is preventing the prison system from paying for itself. This is unconscionable.

15. Melvin Levitsky, Asst Sec of State for International Narcotic Matters, The Andean Strategy to Control Cocaine, Policy No. 1287 (Washington: Dept. of State, 20 June 1990). This policy lays out many economic assistance measures, but indicates nothing that specifically targets the endemic poverty.

16. Tina Rosenberg, "Beyond Elections," Foreign Policy, Fall 1991, 78.

17. Henry Cambell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1990) 1162. *Posse comitatus* is the power of the county--the entire population of a county above the age of 15, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases, as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc. Obviously, in this case, we mean the power of the country--the military. Enactment of *posse comitatus* does not violate the Constitution.

18. The enemy in counter-narcotics includes any element that traffics in, uses or supports--either actively or passively--illegal drugs. This includes drug cartels, the Mafia, sympathetic governments, street-pushers, addicts, etc.

19. Blaufarb, Who Will Win?, pp. 28-29.

20. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Thomas G. Bergin (Franklin Center, Pennsylvania: The Franklin Library, 1978), 11-12.

ANNEX C

SUBJECT: Interim Report on Forward Operational Base (FOB) Concept test by 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), 11 December 1991

1. REFERENCES:

a. AR 71-13, Department of the Army Equipment Authorization and Usage Program

b. Memorandum, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), dated 1 Nov 90

c. MTOE 31805LSP10, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group

2. 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) is forward deployed on Okinawa, Japan. As such it is a Forward Operational Base (FOB). Approval was granted by USARPAC (4th SOSC) and Cdr, USASFC to conduct a two year test effective 1 October 90. Beginning in January, 1990, the unit started transitioning from the normal TOE organization to a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (vice HQ Support Company), an Operations Center (OPCEN), Support Center (SPTCEN), Signal Center (SIGCEN) and three line companies.

3. 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) is probably the only Special Forces battalion in a situation that permits a true, long term test of a FOB. The current TOE has many shortfalls limiting independent operations. The goal of the test was to provide substantive data upon which to base a TOE change.

4. The attached TOE was submitted as the one year interim evaluation of the Forward Operational Base (FOB) under which 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group was organized. As a forward deployed, Special Forces Battalion with a high operational tempo (OPTEMPO), 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), (1/1SFG(A)) currently operates as a stand-alone FOB in peacetime as well as during contingencies. During the test period, while in this FOB configuration, 1st Battalion executed a multitude of mission taskings throughout the Pacific Command (PACOM).

5. 1st Bn, 1st SFG(A), averages 100 plus operational deployments per year, with events ranging from planning conferences and site surveys, to Special Forces "A" (SFODA) deployments, MEDCAP exercises, Disaster Assistance And Relief Team (DART) deployments, Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDRE), JCRC Recovery operations, Civic Action Projects and company and battalion (-) deployments.

6. CONCEPT DESCRIPTION

a. The reorganization of the battalion's staff sections into the Operations Center (OPCEN), Support Center (SPTCEN), and Signal Center (SIGCEN) has dramatically reduced the turbulence that is normally experienced during critical contingency deployment. Personnel stability increased while inefficiency and confusion were greatly reduced.

b. This FOB organization (with recommended changes) allows a battalion to execute all peacetime, combat, and contingency operational responsibilities. This test was conducted without external compensation. In order to conduct this test, two Special Forces Detachments, one from each Company A and Company B, were used as internal compensation.

c. A pivotal part of this one year analysis was defining personnel and equipment requirements to fully support a FOB. Attached is a listing of all positions of the FOB that are in addition to current MTOE authorization levels.

7. ASSESSMENT ISSUES: The assessment issues include the observations of the Command Group, Operations Center, Support Center, Signal Center, and the Companies.

COMMAND GROUP
(Organization chart at Tab A)

1. The command group continues to perform the functions of the command headquarters. As a forward based battalion, however new positions are required. These are the unit ministry team consisting of a Chaplain, and Chaplain's Assistant; a Budget Analyst/Resource Management Officer (RMO) and Resource Management NCO (RMNCO). These positions fulfill critical requirements for soldier support during deployments and management of a multi-million dollar annual budget, respectively.
2. With the inclusion of the aforementioned personnel assets, a more effective command headquarters will result, and deployed assets can be supported operationally in a more timely and efficient manner. The recommended additions and changes to the current MTOE structure for this command headquarters and the justifications are attached.

OPERATIONS CENTER (OPCEN)
(Organizational chart at Tab B)

1. The OPCEN section is capable of organizing, deploying, and controlling operational units. It is responsible for forecasting, requesting and managing multi-service air assets and training resources.

2. It is composed of the following sections: S-2, MID, Air Force Weather Section, S-3, S-5 Plans, and Civil Affairs. The inclusion of the Military Intelligence Detachment, Civil Affairs Section, Special Security Officer (SSO), and the Plans section gives the OPCEN the capability to provide widespread support to any operation in the PACOM theater of operations, and to continue such operations indefinitely.

a. S-2. The S-2 consists of the intelligence sections of the battalion and has the mission of analysis, and dissemination/reporting of all intelligence related material. In addition to these primary duties, the S-2 also has the additional duty of acting as the Battalion Security Manager.

(1) The realignment of S-2 and MID personnel has made the chain of command and delegation of authority easier to understand and operate within. Under Special Forces doctrine (FM 31-20), all intelligence at the battalion level is consolidated, except for a small admin section, in the MID. This does not work efficiently. This situation left potential for conflict with questions of work priority and unity of effort. Under the revised configuration, the S-2 has control of all sections, minus the SIGINT sections, which remain under the control of the MID commander, thus erasing the conflict of authority.

(2) The S-2 requires authorization for an SSO and Assistant SSO in the grades of E-6 and E-5 (both 96B MOS), respectively. Currently, the S-2/MID has an SSO communications section consisting of three 31C's (require 4 each), with TS/SCI level clearances. They have the mission of providing the battalion with the ability to communicate at SCI level. The SSO Communications Section operates with the SIGCEN in order to streamline training and supervision. Their SCI billets will remain occupied. During times of deployment, this team will be attached to the SCIF area to perform its duties. Under the newly developed structure, S-2 can continue to provide quality intelligence and security support to the battalion.

b. Military Intelligence Detachment (MID). The Military Intelligence Detachment has the mission of providing collection and reporting of all Special Compartmented Information. It has the assets to provide TCAE and SIGINT support.

(1) Presently, 1st Battalion has operating, under the MID, a

Special Security Officer (SSO) section consisting of two individuals. The SSO functions as the battalion Security Manager for all Top Secret/Special Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) material. In addition to managing this material, the office and it's OIC/NCOIC also assume responsibility for the security of the Special Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which is the storage facility for TS/SCI material.

(2) The section was created as a separate element because the duties and responsibilities of the SSO were too numerous and time consuming to be delegated as an extra duty. Since the formation of the SSO section, the positions of SSO (OIC OR NCOIC) and Assistant SSO have been filled by battalion personnel without 1st battalion having TO & E authorized slots.

c. S-3. The S-3 coordinates with both adjacent and higher headquarters to include foreign agencies, sister services, and embassy personnel in support of deploying elements. The S-3 also conducts periodic training inspections of subordinate units to ensure compliance with applicable policies and regulations. It forecasts, requests and controls FY class V allocations, prepares routine, classified and focal point electronic messages for approval and transmission. It receives and distributes classified and focal point messages. It coordinates for JA/ATT and opportune airlift with sister services. It advises the commander of all NBC related matters and ensures that mandatory NBC training and inspections are conducted. It forecasts, requests, manages, allocates and budgets for DA, foreign, SOCOM, divisional, civil, and service school quotas. The S-3 section is capable of organizing, deploying, controlling and supporting the sustainment of operational units. It is responsible for forecasting, requesting, and managing multi-service air assets and training facilities. It conducts daily intelligence briefings to the command group and holds periodic briefings for visitors to the command, as well as maintain status on deployed operational units.

(1) Currently, the two Area Specialty Team (AST) sections are task organized by geographic location. This permits the development of true area expertise. Furthermore, when coordinating with foreign countries, Defense Attaches, and JUSMAG's, it provides the same battalion point of contact, reducing confusion and enhancing efficiency. The S-3 training AST is assigned to and works for the S-3. During wartime, this section will fall under the control of the SPTCEN to provide training and coordination for uncommitted detachments.

(2) Properly staffed, the OPCEN is able to continue to conduct ongoing operations in the theater and to provide continuous operations.

d. S-5 Plans. This section performs long range planning, prepares emergency deployment operations orders, and maintains after action reports. It also holds contingency war plans for the theater, edits and stores mission letters, standing operating procedures, and lessons learned. As well as editing and storing, this is the place where teams come to receive information on

missions that have been previously conducted and to review lessons learned. This section also performs force modernization duties by implementing measures to request new equipment and personnel for the battalion.

(1) This section houses all historical data on operational missions and battalion key events. It disseminates doctrinal material to the units and provides written reports to changes in doctrine as sent forth by higher headquarters. This critical review of doctrine effects not only how the battalion fights, but also effects how it trains and organizes based on the specified and implied missions and scenarios depicted in war plans for the PACOM area.

e. Civil Affairs Section. The Civil Affairs section is one of the most important elements required for FID and contingency operations. It is totally lacking from the TOE. The Civil Affairs section (CA) is responsible for providing support for civic action projects and for humanitarian assistance.

(1) It coordinates with indigenous personnel to allow entrance to countries through projects that enhance our relations. This asset is considered invaluable, especially in this theater. Currently it is staffed with one officer (39C) and one NCO (11B). These personnel are assigned to the unit on Temporary Duty orders for 179 days. This costs the Battalion an estimated 40,000.00 dollars annually. These two personnel get overwhelmed. Four personnel are needed.

(2) Having a CA team assigned to an FOB enhances operations due to the stability and habitual relationships developed and provides for access to some areas that are otherwise closed.

SUPPORT CENTER (SPTCEN)
(Organizational chart at Tab C)

1. The SPTCEN provides the administration and logistical combat service support for the battalion. It has the capability to plan, coordinate and execute administrative, medical, waterborne, general supply, food service, mechanical maintenance, and air delivery support and services to the battalion.

a. The Support Center (SPTCEN) Director needs to be a Major and cannot be dual hatted as the HSC Commander. The duties are significantly different and diverse. The SPTCEN Director has the responsibility to coordinate and integrate all support functions for not only deployed elements, but also the FOB. He is responsible for the following functions:

(1) S-1 Section. The S-1 section provide all administration support for the personnel management of the battalion. Current MTOE manning is adequate.

(2) Property Book Section. The Property book section has the capability for establishing the policies and procedures for requesting, receiving, storing, safeguarding, turning in, and accounting for all supplies and equipment within the battalion. It also has the responsibility for accounting for durable and nonexpendable items procured in this battalion. During the past twelve months the section has performed admirably under the FOB concept configuration. The personnel have successfully accomplished all missions, under many different conditions. The PBO works for the SPTCEN Director, not the S-4 directly.

(3) Battalion Medical Section. The Battalion Medical Section is responsible for the health of the command and to ensure all it's members are medically mission capable. It ensures that all medical factors affecting readiness and deployability of the battalion are anticipated and managed. This includes coordinating and supervising training for soldiers with MOS 18D. It provides medical coverage for both garrison (physicals and sick call) and on deployments to include Medical Capabilities (MEDCAPS) exercises, and Disaster Assistance and Relief Team (DART) missions. It acts as technical advisor for all medical issues, and functions as the battalion liaison for other units in the PACOM area. It provides administrative and medical logistical support for the battalion. The major problem area is the lack of medical administrative and logistical personnel. Over the past years, we have noted deficiencies in both medical logistics and administrations. This section also lacks adequately trained personnel in both medical logistics and administration. In order to correct this problem, it needs to have two personnel added to the section; a 76J Medical Supply NCO, and 67B Medical Service Corps Officer.

(a) The FOB's missions are very demanding and require

extensive medical support. The present MTOE, with flight surgeon, Physician's assistant, and medics provide technical expertise to meet the health care needs of the command, however the section is deficient in formally trained personnel in medical logistics or medical administrations. This is a critical deficiency because it carries with it the ability to adequately order and distribution needed medical equipment and supplies to the operational area. These two positions described in the preceding paragraph are provided for at group level, however not to forward deployed battalions. FOB's are not colocated with a Special Forces Group and, therefore do not get the benefit or support of having these personnel assigned.

(b) CONUS units have ready access to Special Forces Group level or even Army level MEDDAC'S. FOBs are required to operate without the autonomy of a group. This section requires trained personnel to handle the administrative and logistical matters. Using medics, Physicians, and Physician's Assistants in administrative and logistical roles not only leads to inefficiency, but also denies them time to devote to their specialties, thus eroding technical efficiency in their areas of expertise. This compromises both training of 18D medics and mission support.

(4) S-4 Section. The S-4 Section is responsible for providing all support to the FOB, less PBO medical and personnel. The change from the TOE is to place the services platoon under the S-4.

(a) Rigger Air Delivery Section. The rigger air delivery section provides maintenance and aerial delivery support for 1st Battalion. These missions include: parachute packing and inspection, organizational or limited direct support maintenance, technical assistance in matters pertaining to air delivery, routine rigger inspections preceding personnel and cargo drops, malfunction coverage during airborne operations, and calibration of equipment. The rigger detachment has too few personnel to support a high OPTEMPO in a diverse FID environment.

1 The rigger section is hard pressed to support the battalion when two or more companies are being used. Depending on the mission, two riggers are required for repack, and as many as five have been required for large exercises. This leaves only one or two riggers for other operations. We routinely must seek USMC or USAF rigger support.

2 Another problem is keeping up with the maintenance of air items between missions. Several training operations have been put on hold or cancelled due to the need to catch up on maintenance. This section needs twelve riggers to support an FOB, vice the seven now authorized.

(b) Battalion Mechanical Maintenance Section. The mechanical maintenance section provides organizational and limited direct support maintenance for the battalion's generators and vehicles, both in their garrison and field locations. The section provides limited class III POL for the

motor pool and maritime operations locker. It also provides class IX support for all the separate entities within the battalion, to include Riggers air delivery, Food Service Section, Maritime Operations (MAROPS) locker, Arms room, and NBC.

1 The maintenance section is set up to provide maintenance support for a limited number of generators and vehicles. The section is not manned to be the Battalion transportation section. When mechanics are driving, they are not maintaining. Each company has a B detachment and AST's. It is essential that these soldiers become qualified to operate all the vehicles inherent to the battalion and any other vehicle which would facilitate the B teams ability to deploy the A detachments. The A Detachments/teams should also be familiar with, and be able to safely operate a myriad of different types of vehicles. This would not only enhance the team's ability to become mobile during E & E or emergencies, but would also enable them to support themselves during garrison operations.

2 The maintenance section does not need the heavy vehicle mechanic, (63S1P), or the construction Equipment Mechanic (62B1P), because the battalion is not authorized any of this type equipment. These positions should be converted to automotive repairmen, (63W1/2P), to give the battalion the ability to support themselves with the Direct Support maintenance needed in our theater. At the present time, no Direct Support has been designated for us in theater. If these positions cannot be converted to DS mechanics, then, at a minimum, they should be converted to Sergeant/E-5, light wheeled vehicle mechanics (63B2P).

(c) Food Service Section. The Food Service Section has the responsibility to provide ration service to the 1st Battalion. Their main mission is to ensure that all members are properly fed or provided a meal in a timely fashion. In the present FOB configuration, the Food Service section does not change.

(d) Maritime Operations Facility (MAROPS). The Maritime Operations Facility has the responsibility to support all maritime operations within the battalion. This is both surface and subsurface equipment. The facility also supports the oxygen requirements for free fall operations.

1 Since all Special Operations during UWO must follow Navy regulations, there is a significant TOE shortfall. The key areas are that more divers are needed and the MAROPS facility needs its own PLL account and clerk. The diver issue is critical.

2 The current TOE authorizes one 18B30W7 for diving operations. To meet Navy requirements the MAROPS facility needs a fully staffed facility. The positions for this facility are outlined later.

3 The PLL account and clerk are required due to the density of repair parts on hand. Currently, the section has over 450 different

repair parts on hand. It needs to keep approximately 100 more. To keep track of all the items it needs its own PLL clerk and account. A total of over 2,900 parts are needed to maintain the MAROPS equipment. Also, the facility must access the Navy supply system. These systems do not match. A PLL clerk with training and knowledge of both systems is required.

4 Another issue is the Battalion Dive Officer. The Navy regulations require a dive officer as the supervisor of the dive locker and dive equipment. Presently this position is filled by personnel not on a full time basis. Either we must get relief from the Navy regulations or assign a full time Officer or Warrant as Chief of the MAROPS facility.

SIGNAL CENTER (SIGCEN)
(Organizational chart at Tab D)

1. Signal Center (SIGCEN). The SIGCEN provides all support regarding communications and information management. It has the responsibility to deploy assets in support of Special Operations anywhere in the theater and to maintain communications with deployed elements on a continuous basis.

a. The position of Battalion Communications- Electronics Staff Officer has changed to that of the Signal Center Director. The Director of the Signal Center is responsible for the Signal Detachment, the Communications-Electronics Section, the Electronic Maintenance Section, the FOB Cryptofacility Section, and the Automatic Data Processing Section. Also, a provisional nondeployable Communications Center has been created and is under his direction.

b. The job of Director of the Signal Center requires frequent interaction with higher headquarters, both joint and theater Army as well as combined operations with foreign Armed Forces. The level of experience needed requires this position to be a Major/C4. Additionally, the Director and CE Operations NCO are required to perform the duties of frequency manager. The lack of training in this area could be removed by requiring the Director to possess ASI: 5D - Frequency Spectrum Manager. This skill will especially be required should operations include a build up of conventional forces using SINCGARS as well as HF, UHF, RATT, and the various other current communications systems. In view of these requirements a change should be made to reflect the C-E Officer to become the Signal Center Director 25COO (5D, 5M, 5P, 4H).

c. The SIGCEN also provides maintenance support for tactical radio systems, communications security devices, and automated information systems. It is unique in that it contains an automation section responsible for installing, maintaining and upgrading all automation assets within the battalion. This added capability gives the SIGCEN the ability to perform repairs far forward and is more efficient.

(1) Communications-Electronics (C-E) Operations. Provides planning and coordination of communications operations for deployed elements to include frequency spectrum management and analysis. The absence of area communications network and Defense Communications System (DCS) knowledge within the C-E section continues to be a problem. Recommend that an upgrade and change from 18E40 Commo NCO (106/01) to 31Z5P Area Communications Chief and change from 18E30 Commo NCO (106/03) to 31C3P (A4) C-E Operations NCO.

(2) Communications Security (COMSEC) Section. Provides

storage, control, issue, and disposition of COMSEC equipment and material both in garrison and when deployed.

(a) Year-round operational deployments by the detachments and sections within the battalion require constant communications security (COMSEC) support and the issue and turn-in of cryptographic material. Without a dedicated Cryptofacility Custodian, the operational detachments would have to travel to Fort Buckner (HQ, 1140th Signal Bn) to request, draw, and return cryptographic material. This arrangement is unacceptable for emergency and contingency operations support because of short time suspenses that have to be met by this unit. Also, obtaining a deployable Crypto Custodian from 1140th Signal Bn to meet our deployment schedule and short time suspenses would likewise be difficult to achieve. The current solution of tasking the Crypto Custodian as an additional duty works only during slow periods of activity. Another problem in this area is the maintenance of COMSEC equipment. At present, equipment which is not mission capable (NMC) must be shipped to Hawaii by courier for repair and then returned. This repair system degrades the battalion command and control. The Battalion COMSEC Section should have the internal capability to repair the assigned equipment.

(b) Adding one (1) 74C3P Cryptofacility Custodian (106/05) and two (2) 74C2P Alternate Cryptofacility Custodians (106/08) to maintain FOB Cryptofacility and COMSEC Account would significantly improve COMSEC support operations.

(c) The addition of one (1) Cryptographic Equipment Repairer (29S2P) is required to provide necessary COMSEC equipment repair at the current location as well as deployed operational areas.

(d) The addition of these recommended personnel will allow for proper control of Crypto material (some of which requires two person control) and repair of authorized COMSEC equipment. This manning will also make possible deployments, school attendance, and leave for the Crypto personnel.

(3) Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Section. The SIGCEN currently has the responsibility for automation maintenance and support for the 1st Battalion. This support is required due to the high density of automation within the unit and the requirements by higher headquarters for information systems security and upgrade. Provides for implementation and management of assets and systems, training of personnel, graphics and briefing chart support, and maintenance of unit master data base. This is a new section in the FOB.

(a) The lack of an Automatic Data Processing Section hinders the ability of the SIGCEN to provide expertise and management of automation systems. The ADP Section would increase data and information flow from outside information sources and agencies. A unit ADP program is the first step to maximizing use of computerized data and information systems

within the battalion. The ADP Section provides technical expertise in hardware and software systems, and projects an ADP budget to reflect additional hardware and software purchases for the battalion.

(b) The creation of an Automatic Data Processing Section solves the problem of managing complex hardware and software systems, as well as implementing networks. It would be comprised of one (1) 74F4P ADP NCOIC and one (1) ADP NCO to provide the necessary expertise to the FOB since currently no ADP personnel are authorized below the Group level.

(c) The creation of an automatic data processing section will allow the unit to keep pace with the Army and employ its automation assets more effectively.

(4) Electronic Maintenance and Repair (EMS) Section. Provides maintenance and repair support up to a limited General Support level for all organic signal equipment, as well as any other electronic items, within the unit.

(a) The Electronic Maintenance Section lacks the capability to repair special electronic devices (ie. night vision equipment, NBC warning systems, Global Positioning systems, etc. The battalion has eleven LINS totalling 333 separate items, as well as over 40 non-standard pieces of equipment, which are not repairable by the current series of repairmen authorized. These items presently have to be evacuated straight to the General Support Maintenance Unit (GSU). During deployments, if no GSU is present, this equipment is NMC until redeployment to Okinawa.

(b) One (1) SGT/E5 Special Electronics Devices Repairer, MOS 39E2P is needed. The addition of a 39E2P repairman to the Electronic Maintenance Section is critical to a forward deployed Special Forces Battalion since maintenance support in target areas will be austere at best and probably nonexistent. This position should be considered a new requirement. The conversion of an existing repairer is not a solution as this will further increase the current excessive workload on the six (6) repairmen of the section.

(5) Signal Detachment. Provides functional and reliable UHF and HF radio communications, Tactical Telecommunications Center, and Radio Teletypewriter/HF Multichannel support in either the garrison or deployed roles. Provide 24 hour Base Station and Communications Center support anytime detachments are deployed or otherwise operational.

(a) Currently, the Signal Center is experiencing great difficulty in providing continuous HF Base Station and Garrison Communications Center support to the FOB. Due to electronic emissions control on Okinawa, the base station is located on a separate island off the coast. As a substantial geographic distance separates the HF Base Station from the FOB headquarters, the Signal Detachment is required to maintain an operational communications center whenever detachments are deployed (over 300 days a year). This

requirement causes extreme hardship with the current MTOE authorized personnel and equipment. The personnel and equipment required to provide this communications center are the same assets required to install, operate, and maintain C-Team Command and Control systems.

(b) The addition of a TDA Communications Center with personnel to provide year-round support without stripping the Signal Detachment of MTOE assets is required. Personnel requirements are one (1) SSG, three (3) SGT, three (3) SPC in MOS 74C (parachutist qualification not required as personnel are not deployable).

(c) In September 91, we received the Communications Central: AN/TSC-122. This assemblage is an HF Multi-channel Radio System which was designed to replace the current Radioteletypewriter Set: AN/GRC-122 (RATT). Recent information received indicates this system will augment not replace the current RATT system. The current manning for the RATT team will not allow for the simultaneous manning of both assemblages. If the AN/TSC-122 is to replace the RATT then a change in the authorized MOSs is required as well as an increase in personnel. Adding a four man team to operate TSC-122 system is required. One (1) 31C3P NCOIC, one (1) 31C1P RDO OPR, one (1) 31M2P Multi-channel Radio NCO, and one (1) 31M1P Multi-channel Radio OPR should be authorized to operate the system which is now on hand. This MOS composition is required since this system is a hybrid assemblage not unique to a single MOS; the 31C personnel are required for HF Radio and antenna knowledge, while the 31M soldiers are required for the multiplexing equipment within the system. Also, if the AN/TSC-122 is to replace the current radioteletypewriter set, an increase of one soldier will still be required as well as changing the MOS of two soldiers to 31M. Without the addition of the above mentioned four (4) man team the AN/TSC-122 system cannot be operated. The personnel changes are essential if the unit is to operate the equipment.

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT B
(Organizational chart at Tab E)

1. The ODB structure requires change. It must have the capability to operate as a command and control element for detachments, establish an Advanced Operational Base (AOB), operate as a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), and conduct independent operations.
2. The following ODB structure changes are required:
 - a. Add two 18F as Area Specialists (ASTs)
 - b. Add an 18C40
 - c. Add one 71L clerk

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

(Organizational chart at Tab F)

The Headquarters and Headquarters Company requires a foreign weapons armorer, E6, 18B30. No other structural changes are required.

Personnel Justifications

1. This section contains justifications for changes and organizational variation from the FOB structure depicted in FM 31-20.

2. Command Section. The Command Section is modified with the inclusion of a Battalion Unit Ministry Team, consisting of a Chaplain and Chaplain's Assistant. As part of the Commander's Special Staff, the Chaplain should be separate from the Centers and not under the S-1 Section as depicted in FM 31-20. The Deputy Commander assumes responsibility for the FOB and direct supervision of the OPCEN, SPTCEN, SIGCEN, HSC, and the Resource Management Officer (RMO)/Budget Section. Upon deployment, the RMO is attached to the SPTCEN.

a. Deputy Commander, 04, 18A00, change in duty description from Executive Officer. Assumes responsibility for the FOB and direct supervision of the OPCEN, SPTCEN, SIGCEN, HSC, Chaplain, and RMO. Assumes command in the absence of the Battalion Commander.

b. Battalion Chaplain, O-3, 56A00 (5P), new position. A Battalion Chaplain position is needed for a forward deployed Special Forces battalion. He advises the Commander on issues involving personnel morale and welfare. The chaplain needs to be able to deploy anywhere with the unit to support both training and contingency missions. The ability to be with and support the soldiers on difficult deployments enables the chaplain to share a unique relationship with the soldiers of a Special Forces battalion. This relationship fosters the high level of trust and confidence needed in order to assist the soldiers with counseling in difficult personal or family situations, and to provide the necessary assistance, if needed in order to complete critical missions. The airborne qualification allows the chaplain to participate in all training exercises and strengthens his relationship with the soldiers.

c. Chaplain's Assistant, E-4, 71M1P. The Chaplain's assistant provides the administrative support and assistance needed to enable the chaplain to fully support the soldiers of a Special Forces battalion. He provides assistance to the chaplain as well as supports him in the provision of services in garrison and field environments. The airborne qualification enables him to deploy with the chaplain on all exercises.

d. Resource Management Officer/ Budget Officer, FA 45 (or 18/45). The Resource Management Office includes a Budget Officer/RMO and Budget NCO/RMNCO. It will be initially organized directly under the battalion Deputy Commander. At a later date, the RMO will be integrated as a separate subordinate element, directly under the SPTCEN. The unit budget officer is responsible for the planning, programming, budgeting and execution of funds. Currently, the position is filled by an 18A Officer. Special Operations involves the extensive interfacing with sister services and foreign governments, and

requires a full time commitment from a qualified Officer, FA 45.

e. Resource Management/Budget NCO, E-5, 75B2P. A Budget NCO is required to augment and assist the Budget Officer in supervising and reviewing all documents pertaining to the commitment and obligation of funds. He prepares all temporary duty (TDY) orders and reviews all travel vouchers prior to submittal to the finance office. The resource management NCO is also required to assume the duties of the Budget Officer in his absence.

f. Operations Center Director, 04, 18A00, change in duty description from Battalion S-3. The OPCEN Director is directly responsible for the S-2, Military Intelligence Detachment, S-3, S-5 PLANS, Civil Affairs, LNOs, and, upon deployment, the Isolation Facility (ISOFAF).

g. Support Center Director, 03, 92B00/5P, change in duty description from Battalion S-4. The SPTCEN Director is responsible for the S-1, Property Book Officer, S-4, Medical Section, Rigger Air Delivery Section, Food Service Section, Mechanical Maintenance Section, Supply and Transportation Section, and the Maritime Operations Facility (MAROPS).

h. Signal Center Director, 03, 25C00 (5D, 5M, 5P, 4H), , change in duty description from Signal Detachment Commander. The SIGCEN Director is responsible for the Base Communications Support Section, the Base Station Section, the Electrical Maintenance Section, the Communications Center, the SSO Communications Section, COMSEC section, and the Automation section. The additional skills are critical and provide qualification in frequency management, airborne operations, electronic warfare and automation.

3. Operations Center.

a. Operations Center NCOIC/SGM, E-9, 18Z50, change in duty description from Operations NCO to become the OPCEN NCOIC/SGM. Responsible for daily operations of the OPCEN, including administrative matters dealing with OPCEN personnel. Advises the OPCEN Director concerning operational issues. During FOB deployment or employment, he establishes the OPCEN and runs daily operations IAW guidance provided by the OPCEN Director. He is the senior NCO for OPCEN.

b. S-3, 03, 18A00, change in duty description from Operations Officer to become the S-3. He replaces the O-4/S-3 that became the Operation Center Director.

c. Operations Officer, W-4, 180A0. change in duty description from Special Forces Technician to become the Battalion Operations Officer. Replaces the O-3/Operations Officer that became the Battalion S-3.

d. Operations NCO, E8, 18Z50, change in duty description from SFODA Operations NCO to become the Battalion Operations NCO. Replaces the

E-9/Operations NCO that became the OPCEN NCOIC. Assists the S-3 in the planning, coordination, and supervision of all unit operations and training. Responsible for S-3 daily operations and unit training schedules. Assists the S-3 in the preparation of operation plans and orders.

e. Area Specialist Technician, W-4, 180A0, (3 positions) change in duty description from SFODA Special Forces Technician to become Battalion Area Specialist Technician (AST), responsible for exercise deployment preparation, coordination, control, and support. Conducts all external coordination and prepares message traffic with higher headquarters, other services (USAF, USN, and USMC), foreign service consulates and embassies, JUSMAGs or country teams, and foreign military and governments in support of the operational detachments. Requests mission concept (MICON) and area clearance approval, billeting and transportation arrangements, storage and training facilities, deployment and redeployment aircraft, and TDY orders. In charge of an AST section supporting the SFODAs and SFODBs.

f. Area Specialist Technician, W-4, 180A0, change in duty description from SFODA Special Forces Technician to become the S-3 Training AST. Responsible for managing and coordinating for all TDY schools (both MOS specific and professional development), weapons ranges, maneuver ranges, air operations, and local training areas. Conducts all external coordination in support of unit training requests. Upon deployment of the FOB, detaches his three-man training section from the OPCEN/S-3 and integrates into the SPTCEN to provide training support for non-deployed operational detachments.

g. Area Specialist NCO's, 18E40 (2 positions), change in duty description from SFODA Communications NCO, to become Battalion Area Specialist NCOs. Assists the AST in the performance of his duties. Performs as the AST in his absence. Responsible for maintaining the AST files IAW U. S. Army Regulations.

h. Air Operations NCO, 18F40, change in duty description from SFODA Assistant Operations, to become the Battalion Air Operations NCO. Responsible for all external coordination with air support units (in theater forces and reserve deployed units) for exercise and training mission support. Conducts initial coordination for close air support, airborne operations, training support, exercise support, and transportation support (conferences, exercises, etc.). Represents the unit and submits requests at PACOM JA/ATT conferences. Prepares message traffic to support air operations.

i. Battalion Plans Officer, 03, 18A00, change in duty description from SFODA Detachment Commander to become the Battalion S-5 Plans Officer. Responsible for developing and modifying battalion operation plans and orders, planning future operations and exercises, modifying the MTOE and TDA under the force development program, maintaining the battalion historical files, developing war and contingency plans, revising standard operating procedures (SOPs) and programs of instruction (POIs), and managing the force development

and modernization program.

j. Battalion Plans NCO, E8, 18Z50, change in duty description from SFODA Operations NCO to become the battalion Plans NCO. Responsible for planning future operations, modifying battalion operation plans and orders, and preparing briefings for the Command Group, higher headquarters, and VIPs. Performs as the Plans Officer in his absence.

k. Assistant Battalion Plans NCO, E7, 18F40, change in duty description from SFODA Assistant Operations/Intelligence Sergeant to become the battalion Assistant Plans NCO. Responsible for the battalion force development program, including the submission of changes to the MTOE and TDA documents; and the revision and updating of battalion SOPs and POIs. Maintains and edits IAW Army Regulations, the Plans file system including AARs, POIs, SOPs, policies, plans, and orders.

l. Liaison Officer, O-3, 18A00, change of duty description from SFODA Detachment Commander to become the Battalion Liaison Officer (LNO) for the U. S. Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) in PACOM. As the AFSOF LNO for battalion, coordinates for air support related issues including transportation, joint air operations, training support, logistical support, and interoperability issues. The AFSOF LNO section provides in country training and intelligence support for the battalion and the operational detachments.

m. Liaison Officer, O3, 18A00, change of duty description from SFODA Detachment Commander to become the Battalion Liaison Officer for the U. S. Navy Special Operations Forces (NAVSOF) in PACOM. As the NAVSOF LNO for battalion, coordinates for naval support related issues including transportation, joint naval operations, training support, logistical support, and interoperability issues. The NAVSOF LNO section provides in country training and intelligence support for the battalion and the operational detachments. This Officer should be dive qualified (4W identifier)

n. Liaison NCO, E7, 18B40, change of duty description from SFODA Weapons NCO to become the Battalion AFSOF Liaison NCO. Assists the AFSOF LNO in the performance of his duties described above. Performs as the AFSOF LNO in the absence of his superior. Establishes a working relation with host unit intelligence analysts and provides an additional source of intelligence data to the unit.

o. Liaison NCO, E7, 18B40, change of duty description from SFODA Weapons NCO to become the Battalion NAVSOF Liaison NCO. Assists the NAVSOF LNO in the performance of his duties described above. Performs as the NAVSOF LNO in the absence of his superior. Establishes a working relation with host unit intelligence analysts and provides an additional source of intelligence data to the unit.

p. SPECAT FPO, E7, 18F40, change of duty description from SFODA

Assistant Operations/Intelligence Sergeant to become the battalion Special Category Focal Point Officer (SPECAT FPO). Manages the SPECAT program IAW Army Regulations for compartmented operations. Prepares SPECAT message traffic and provides focal point control of all SPECAT operations. Advises the command group and SPECAT cleared personnel concerning SPECAT related issues. Conducts SPECAT planning and coordination with other units. Assists in the preparation of SPECAT logistical support requests. Supervises the SPECAT Clerk.

q. Civil Affairs (CA) Officer (2 ea), O-3, 39C (18/39)/ 5P. Change in duty position from 101/03 S-5. The CA team is composed of two Civil Affairs Officers, (FA 39, or 18/39), one NCO (E-7, 11B/18F), and one Specialist (E-4, 95B1P) who provide support and assistance for humanitarian assistance and Civil-military operations within the PACOM theater. The team serves as an interface between US Special Forces and foreign personnel that would enhance or minimize damage to civil affairs and psychological operations. The team advises the Commander on projects that will enhance or minimize damage to civil affairs and psychological operations in the theater of operations. They are required to be subject matter experts on military, political, cultural, social, and religious aspects of priority countries. The NCO should be a graduate of the Civil Affairs Officer Course, and Psychological Operations basic course. It is also enhancing if the team is qualified in a theater of operations language. Having these personnel assigned would save the unit over 80,000.00 per year in funds expended. Currently we are operating with two personnel (one Officer, one NCO) that are TDY from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. They are rotating on a six-month basis. The following positions are required for a complete team:

(1) Civil Affairs NCO, E-7, 11B/18F40, coordinates, plans and supervises Civil-Military operations.

(2) Civil Affairs Specialist, E-4, 95B1P.

r. S-2 Section. The S-2 requires a Special Security Officer (SSO) and Assistant Special Security Officer (ASSO), in the grades of E-6 and E-5 (both 95B MOS), respectively. These positions are required to meet U. S. Army on Okinawa and battalion requirements for receiving, transmitting, and processing sensitive, compartmented information both on Okinawa and in a field environment upon FOB deployment. The SSO is responsible for the sensitive, compartmented information facility (SCIF), which processes all U. S. Army compartmented information transmitted from or received on Okinawa. The unit requirement to maintain a field SCIF upon deployment creates the need for an ASSO position so that both battalion and U. S. Army Okinawa sensitive compartmented information needs can be met simultaneously.

4. Support Center (SPTCEN)

a. Support Center NCOIC/SGM. The Service Detachment Headquarters Detachment Sergeant assumes duties as the SPTCEN NCOIC, E-9, 76Z5P, the

senior NCO for the SPTCEN. He assists the SPTCEN Director in the performance of duties and is responsible for all enlisted men within the SPTCEN. Support Center NCOIC, change in duty description from Service Detachment Headquarters Detachment Sergeant to become the SPTCEN NCOIC, responsible for daily operations of the SPTCEN, including all administrative matters dealing with SPTCEN personnel. Advises the SPTCEN Director concerning operational issues.

Responsible for the health, education, and welfare of all SPTCEN personnel. Upon FOB deployment, establishes the SPTCEN and assumes responsible for the Resource Management Office, S-3 Training Section, and all uncommitted operational detachments. Senior NCO for the SPTCEN.

b. S-1 Section. No changes required.

c. Property Book section. No personnel changes required.

d. Battalion Medical Section. The Battalion Medical Section is responsible for the health of the command. It requires a Medical NCO, E-7, 18D40. This is a change in grade from E-6 to E-7.

(1) Medical Supply NCO, 76J3P. This is a new position. The Medical Section requires a Medical Supply NCO to provide logistical support for specialized medical supplies and equipment. As an independent battalion, we order and stock medical items without group support. Stand-alone operations require a Medical Supply Specialist be added to our MTOE, the same as on a Special Forces Group (Airborne). Currently, an 18D NCO performs the duties of the Medical Supply Specialist as an additional duty, but does not have the required knowledge or training to adequately provide logistical support to the Medical Section. Over the past years, we have noticed deficiencies in both medical logistics and administrations. This section also lacks adequately trained personnel in both medical logistics and administration. In order to correct this problem, it needs to have a 76J Medical Supply NCO.

(2) Medical Service Corps Officer, 67B00/5P. The battalion's missions are very demanding and require extensive medical support. The present MTOE, with Flight Surgeon, Physician's Assistant, and medics provide technical expertise to meet the health care needs of the command, however the section is deficient in formally trained personnel in medical logistics or medical administration. This is a critical training deficiency because it carries with it the ability to adequately order and distribution needed medical equipment and supplies to the operational areas that the 1st battalion occupies. These two positions described in the preceding paragraph are provided for at group level, however as a forward deployed battalion, we do not fall under 1st Special Forces Group and, therefore do not get the benefit or support of having these personnel assigned. Currently, our higher headquarters in theater, 4th Special Operations Support Command (4th SOSO), has no medical support personnel assigned. To further compound problems, there are no other Army medical assets on Okinawa. CONUS units have ready access to Special Forces Group

level or even army level MEDDAC'S. This unit is required to operate with the autonomy of a group without their assets or assigned personnel. This unit requires adequately trained personnel proficient in the ability to handle the administrative and logistical matters so critical to mission success and sustainment. Utilizing highly trained medical, physicals and Physician's assistants in administrative and logistical roles not only leads to inefficiency, but also denies them time to devote to their specialties, thus eroding technical efficiency in their areas of expertise. This compromises both training of 18D medics and mission support. The FOB concept per se does not affect the medical section (i.e. working for the support center). The major problem remains the lack of appropriate administrative and logistical personnel within the medical section. The Support Center (SPTCEN), 4th SOSG, and 1st Special Forces Group do not provide these assets. Going forward deployed makes the addition of these personnel imperative.

d. S-4 Supply and Logistics Section. The S-4 Section is expanded to fully support the needs of the operational detachments under the provisional MTOE. The SPTCEN provides overall supervision and guidance to the S-4 Section. The S-4 assumes staff supervision for the rigger air delivery section, the food service section, the mechanical maintenance section, the supply and transportation section, and the newly established maritime operations facility (MAROPS facility). The MAROPS facility is staffed to provide service and support for the wide range of MAROPS specific equipment, including both open circuit and closed circuit underwater breathing apparatus (UBA), scout swimmer support sets, Klepper folding canoes, Zodiac F470 combat rubber raiding craft (CRRC) and outboard engines, a certified compressed air and oxygen fill station, specialized repair tools, and a prescribed load list (PLL). Maritime operations and maintenance must be in compliance with U. S. Navy Regulations, OPNAVINST 4790.4B, and the 3M maintenance system. U. S. Navy maintenance standards require 3700 man hours (minimum) annually to meet dive locker certification standards, not including maintenance due to equipment repair or additionally issued MAROPS equipment.

(1) S-4, O-3, 92B00/5P, change in duty description from Service Detachment Headquarters Commander to become the battalion S-4 Supply and Logistics Officer, responsible for the Rigger Air Delivery Section, Food Service Section, Maritime Operations Facility, Mechanical Maintenance Section, and the Supply and Transportation Section. Replaces O-3/S-4 92B00/5P that became the SPTCEN Director.

(2) Rigger Air Delivery section. This section requires an additional five parachute packers, E-3, 43E1P.

(3) Battalion Mechanical Maintenance section. This section requires MOS changes. The section does not have a requirement for a Heavy Vehicle Mechanic (63S1P), or Construction Equipment Mechanic (62B1P). These slots should be changed to reflect Automotive Repairman (63W1/2P). This change allows this battalion the ability to support itself for Direct Support

(DS) vehicle maintenance.

(4) Food Service section. No changes required.

(5) Maritime Operations Facility.

(a) The facility requires a Director, W-3, 180A/4W, change in duty description from SFODA Technician to become the Maritime Operations Facility Director, appointed as the Battalion Dive Officer, responsible for providing training, service, support and safety for all MAROPS oriented equipment and training. Provides overall supervision of all MAROPS. Ensures strict adherence to procedures and precautions. Establishes a MAROPS training program and ensures frequent training is scheduled. Supervises the maintenance of the Maritime Operations Facility and MAROPS equipment. Supervises the maintenance of the Diving Log and ensures that all required reports are made. Complies with OPNAVINST 3120.23B, OPNAVINST 4790.4B and all applicable U.S. Navy regulations. He is the Battalion 3M Coordinator. Supervises the Maritime Operations Facility NCOIC. The MAROPS Facility Director needs to be an experienced combat diver and combat dive supervisor on active status, preferably with additional dive related technical qualifications.

(b) Maritime Operations Facility NCOIC, E8, 18Z50/S6, change in duty description from SFODA Operations NCO to become the Maritime Operations Facility NCOIC, appointed as the Battalion Command Senior Diver, responsible for providing training, service, support and safe operation for all MAROPS oriented equipment and training. He is the MAROPS Facility 3M Department Head. Maintains and services open circuit and closed circuit UBA, Mk 13 Kayaks, Zodiac F470 CRRC, 35 H.P. outboard motors, swimmer support sets, and compressed air and oxygen compressors. Maintains a fully stocked PLL and specialized repair tools. Supports Underwater Operations (UWO) with certified compressed air and oxygen fill stations. Complies with OPNAVINST 3120.23B, OPNAVINST 4790.4B, and all applicable U.S. Navy regulations. Supervises the Open Circuit Supervisor, Closed Circuit Supervisor, Closed Circuit Technician, Fill Station Supervisor, CRRC/Canoe Work Center Supervisor, CRRC/Canoe Repair Technician, Outboard Motor Work Center Supervisor, and PLL Clerk. The MAROPS NCOIC needs to be an experienced combat diver and combat dive supervisor on active dive status, preferably with additional dive related technical qualifications.

(c) Open Circuit Supervisor, E7, 18D40/S6, change in duty description from SFODA Medical NCO to become the MAROPS Facility Open Circuit Supervisor, responsible for the maintenance and service of 18 open circuit dive equipment sets, 36 individual swimmer support sets, and additional surface swimmer support sets. He is the 3M Work Center Supervisor for DV01 (open circuit support sets and related maintenance equipment). The O/C Supervisor provides detachment on basics maintenance of the equipment. He performs all 2nd echelon and depot level maintenance on the open circuit sets, surface swimmer support sets and related maintenance equipment. The O/C

Supervisor is the "Quality Assurance " inspector for all equipment and maintenance in his work center. The O/C Supervisor requests PLL and SSSC repair parts and supplies through the MAROPS PLL Clerk. He is cross trained in fill station operations and assists in operations and maintenance of the fill station. The O/C Supervisor needs to be an experienced combat diver and combat dive supervisor on active status . His technical qualifications should include completing 3M Admin and Op (J-500-0025), U.S. Divers equipment repair, and compressor technician courses.

(d) Closed Circuit Supervisor, E7, 18D40/S6, change in duty description from SFODA Medical NCO to become the MAROPS Facility Closed Circuit Supervisor, responsible for the maintenance and service of 36 closed circuit dive equipment sets and the oxygen safe room/area. He is the Work Center Supervisor for DV02 (closed circuit supports sets and related maintenance equipment). The C/C Supervisor provides instruction to the combat diving detachments on basic maintenance of the equipment. He performs all 2nd echelon and depot level maintenance on the closed circuit support sets. The C/C Supervisor requests PLL and SSSC repair parts and supplies through the MAROPS PLL Clerk. He operates and maintains the oxygen safe room within the U.S. Navy and federal Standards of safety and cleanliness. The C/C Supervisor is the "Quality Assurance" inspector of all equipment and maintenance in his work center. He is cross trained in filling oxygen bottles and the maintenance of the Haskel Oxygen Booster pump and oxygen fill station. The C/C Supervisor needs to be an experienced combat diver, dive medical technician, and combat dive supervisor on active status. His technical qualifications should include completing 3M Admin and Op course (J-500-0025), Draeger Technician Level 1 and compressor technician courses.

(e) Closed Circuit Technician, E-6, 18B30/W7, change in duty description from SFODA Weapons NCO to become the MAROPS Facility Closed Circuit Technician responsible for maintenance of 36 closed circuit dive equipment sets. The C/C Technician provides instruction to the combat diving detachments on basic maintenance of the equipment. He performs all 2nd echelon and depot level maintenance on the closed circuit support sets. The C/C Technician requests PLL and SSSC repair parts and supplies through the MAROPS PLL Clerk. He operates and maintains the oxygen safe room within the U.S. Navy and federal Standards of safety and cleanliness. He is cross trained in filling oxygen bottles and assists the Fill Station Supervisor in the maintenance of the Haskel pump and fill station. The C/C Technician needs to be an experienced combat diver on active status. His technical qualifications should include completing Draeger Technician Level 1, compressor technician courses, and Haskel repair.

(f) Fill Station Supervisor, E-6, 18B30/S6, change in duty description from Company Headquarters Assistant Operations NCO to become the MAROPS Facility Fill Station Supervisor, responsible for the operation, maintenance, and service of all components of the compressed air station, including the cascade system, air storage tanks, fixed and portable

compressors, and other support equipment. Supervises operations of the oxygen fill station, including the Haskell pump, oxygen storage tanks, and the Draeger oxygen bottles. The Fill Station Supervisor is the Work Center Supervisor for DV03. He is responsible for ensuring all fill station air, oxygen, equipment, and procedures are within U.S. Navy and federal standards. He provides instruction to the combat diving detachments on fill station procedures and maintenance of equipment. Performs 2nd echelon and depot level maintenance on components of the compressed air and oxygen fill stations. The Fill Station Supervisor needs to be an experienced combat diver and a combat dive supervisor on active status. His technical qualifications should include completing 3M Admin and Op (J-500-0025), Draeger Technician Level 1, compressor technician, Haskell pump technician, and US Divers equipment repair courses.

(g) Boat Center Supervisor, E-6, 18C30, change in duty description from SFODA Engineer NCO to become the MAROPS Facility Boat Center Supervisor, responsible for the maintenance and service of all Zodiac F470 CRRs, Mk 13 Klepper Folding Canoes, and support equipment. He is the Work Center Supervisor for DV04 (boats and related equipment). The Boat Center Supervisor provides instruction to the combat diving and maritime operations detachments on basic maintenance of the equipment. He performs all 2nd all 2nd echelon and depot level maintenance on the boats. The Boat Supervisor requests PLL and SSSC repair parts through the MAROPS PLL Clerk. He is cross trained to repair and maintain outboard engines. His technical qualifications should include completing 3M Admin and Op (J-500-0025), Zodiac boat repair technician course and an OMC outboard repair technician course.

(h) Boat Technician, E5, 43M20P, change in duty description from Fabric Repair Specialist to become the MAROPS Facility Boat Technician, responsible for the maintenance and service of all Zodiac F470 CRRs, Mk 13 Klepper Folding Canoes, and related support equipment. The Boat Technician provides instruction to the combat diving and maritime operations detachments on basic maintenance of the equipment. He performs all 2nd all 2nd echelon and depot level maintenance on the boats to include repair of fabric decks and hulls. The Boat Technician requests PLL and SSSC repair parts through the MAROPS PLL Clerk. He is cross trained to repair and maintain outboard engines. His technical qualifications should include completing Zodiac boat repair technician course and an OMC outboard repair technician course.

(i) Outboard Motor Supervisor, E5, 88L2P, change in duty description from Watercraft Engineer to become the MAROPS Facility Outboard Motor (O/B) Supervisor, responsible for the maintenance and service of all outboard motors and related support equipment. He is the work center Supervisor of DV05 (Outboard Motors and related equipment). The O/B Supervisor provides instruction to the combat diving and maritime operations detachments on basic maintenance of the equipment. He performs all 2nd all

2nd echelon and depot level maintenance on the outboard motors. The O/B Supervisor requests PLL and SSSC repair parts through the MAROPS PLL Clerk. He is cross trained to repair and maintain Zodiac F470 CRRs. His technical qualifications should include completing 3M Admin and Operations course (J-500-0025), OMC outboard repair technician course, and be familiar with all aspects of watercraft maintenance.

(j) PLL Clerk, E5, 76C20P, change in duty description from PLL Clerk to become the MAROPS Facility PLL Clerk, responsible for the ordering of over 1500 PLL items for 570 line items. He coordinates with the Battalion PBO for ordering the repair parts and major end items. The PLL Clerk needs to be familiar with the U.S. Navy supply system.

5. Signal Center. The Signal Detachment Headquarters becomes the SIGCEN under the provisional organization. The Signal Detachment Headquarters Detachment Sergeant becomes the SIGCEN NCOIC. He assumes duties as tasked by the SIGCEN Director and is the senior NCO for the SIGCEN.

a. Signal Center NCOIC, E8, 18E50, change in duty description from Signal Detachment Sergeant to become the SPTCEN NCOIC. Responsible for daily operations of the SIGCEN, to include administrative matters dealing with SIGCEN personnel. Advises the SIGCEN Director concerning operational issues. Responsible for the health, education, and welfare of all SIGCEN personnel. During FOB deployment, establishes the SIGCEN and runs daily operations IAW guidance provided by the SIGCEN Director. Senior NCO for SIGCEN.

b. Communications-Electronics Section. The C-E Section is organized under the SIGCEN, and upgraded to handle increased responsibilities as part of the FOB. Year-round operational deployments by the detachments and sections within the battalion require constant secure communications support and the issue and turn-in of cryptographic material.

(1) Area Communications Chief, E-8, 31Z5P, change in duty position and grade. Replaces the Commo NCO (18E40). This change significantly impacts on the Signal Center because it gives the capability of area communications knowledge.

(2) C-E Operations NCO, E-6, 31C3P (A4). This is a change in MOS and duty description. The C-E Operations NCO replaces the Commo NCO. The C-E Operations NCO is trained in frequency management and assists the Signal Center Director in performing the critical duties of frequency manager, responsible for providing accurate frequencies for communications transmission within the Pacific theater.

c. Electronic Maintenance Section. The Electronic Maintenance Sections is responsible for providing maintenance for all organic tactical communications systems.

(1) Special Electronics Devices Repairer, E-5, 39E2P. This is a new duty position within the Signal Center. Currently, the Electronic Maintenance Section lacks the capability to repair special electronic devices (i.e. night vision equipment, NBC warning systems, Global Positioning systems, etc.). The battalion currently has eleven LIN's totalling 333 separate items, as well as over 40 non-standard pieces of equipment, which are not repairable by the current series of repairmen authorized on the TOE/MTOE. These items presently have to be evacuated to the General Support Maintenance Unit (GSU), which causes delays in timely repair. During deployments, if no GSU is present, this piece of equipment is rendered non mission capable (NMC) until redeployment back to Okinawa. The addition of this repairman to the Electronic Maintenance section is critical for a forward based Special Forces battalion, since support in target areas will be near non existent. This repairer works on Night Vision devices deemed critical to mission success. The airborne identifier enables the repairer to deploy/train with the unit.

d. COMSEC Section. This section is critical.

(1) Cryptofacility Custodian, E-6, 74C3P. This position is a new position, however, without a dedicated Crypto Custodian, the operational detachments would have to travel to Fort Buckner (1140th Signal Bn) to request, draw, and return cryptographic material. This arrangement is unacceptable for emergencies and contingency operation support, because of short time suspenses that have to be met. Obtaining a deployable Crypto Custodian from 1140th Signal Bn to meet our deployment schedule and short time suspenses would also be difficult to achieve. The current solution of tasking the Crypto Custodian as an additional duty works only during slow periods of activity, and significantly hinders our capability of providing rapid response to contingencies.

(2) Alternate Cryptofacility Custodian, E-5, 74C2P. New position under the COMSEC section. Assists the primary Cryptofacility custodian in maintaining the FOB Cryptofacility and COMSEC (COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY) account. Assumes the duties of the Cryptofacility custodian in his absence.

e. Signal Detachment. The Signal Detachment provides all electronic repair and communications support.

(1) Base Station Section. The Base Station section provides 24 hour support for a Communications Center, reliable UHF and HF radio communications, tactical Telecommunications Center and Radio Teletypewriter (RATT)/HF Multichannel support in either the garrison or deployed roles. It provides 24 hour Base Station and Communications Center support whenever detachments are deployed or otherwise operational.

(2) Special Security Officer (SSO)/Communications Team. The SSO/Communications Team is moved to the Signal Detachment and is attached

to the SCIF upon deployment requires the addition of a full

f. Automatic Data Processing Section. This is a new section. The Automatic Data Processing section is responsible for providing automation maintenance, repair and installation for the battalion. It submits capabilities requests to higher headquarters for automation equipment. It is also responsible for training on new software systems and to implement new systems as directed by higher headquarters. It currently manages a budget to procure the necessary tools and equipment to support all organic automation systems, as well as providing database management and graphics production. This is a new section, and is critical as this battalion in implementing sophisticated information systems to transmit data across the Pacific to other SOF units. This requires expertise in local area networks, application software design, systems architecture and protocols, and installation. This capability is required in order to maintain the rapid flow of critical DOD information available through the various networks in this theater. This battalion currently has no such personnel authorized.

(1) Automatic Data Processing NCOIC, E-7, 74F4P. The Automatic Data Processing NCOIC handles all automation requirements. He provides the technical expertise needed to increase data and information flow from outside information sources and agencies. He is the unit automation program manager, which represents the first step to maximizing use of computerized data and information systems within the battalion. The Automatic Data Processing NCOIC provides technical expertise in hardware and software systems, and projects an automation budget to reflect additional hardware or software requirements. The Automatic Data Processing NCOIC can also provide graphics and presentation support, as required. He section also tests new software and installs it in the battalion's systems after initial testing is accomplished. The Automatic Data Processing NCOIC also staffs a battalion resource center, equipped to handle processing of data for routine use by members of the battalion and to act as the focal point to handle all automation matters in one office, such as maintenance, technical help, graphics support, classes, installation of software, hardware, capabilities requests submission, and other work orders needed to ensure a smooth running automation program. The Automatic Data Processing NCOIC also runs the information systems security program as the alternate Information Systems Security Officer (AISSO), ensuring that all systems are accounted for and that they are properly accredited. The Signal Center Director is the Battalion Information Systems Security Officer.

(2) Automation NCO, E-6, 74F3P. This NCO assists the ADP NCOIC, and is trained in software design, and hardware systems. He performs data and systems analysis to determine the best configuration of hardware/software for the unit. Provides instruction to unit personnel in the various software programs and their use. He maintains the computer room and provides computer set up and basic (user level) repair expertise. He provides assistance with unit level graphics and briefing charts. Establishes and manages

the unit master data base for use by all centers/sections.

6. Company Headquarters (B Detachment). The SFODB is expanded to round out it's capabilities as an operational detachment. An 18C40 is added to each company to provide Special Forces Engineer expertise for planning and operations at the SFODB level. Two company ASTs are added to each company to support the company operational detachments. They provide additional assets to handle the myriad of support tasks required for exercise deployments or training missions. Upon FOB deployment, the company ASTs would augment the battalion AST Sections in providing coordination and mission support for the SFODA/Bs.

a. 201/11, 301/11, 401/11 (3 positions), Company HQ/B Detachment Engineer NCO, 18C40, change in duty description from SFODA Engineer NCO to become Company HQ/B Detachment Engineer NCO, responsible for providing engineer expertise and support on the B Detachment. Advises the B Detachment Commander on all engineering related issues.

b. 201/12, 201/13, 301/12, 301/13, 401/12, 401/13 (6 positions), Company HQ/B Detachment Area Specialist NCO, 18B30 (1), 18C30 (1), 18D30 (2), 18E30 (2), change in duty description from SFODA Weapons NCO (1), Engineer NCO (1), Medical NCO (2), and Communication NCO (2), to become the Company HQ/B Detachment Area Specialist NCO (2 per SFODB). Provides the interface between the SFODAs/SFODBs and the OPCEN/S-3 AST Sections. Responsible for coordinating operational detachment mission support from the planning phase, through the execution phase, until mission completion. Upon deployment of the SFODAs/SFODBs, monitors message traffic, takes required actions for mission support, and responds back to the deployed detachment(s). Maintains an operational mission folder and briefs the OPCEN and Command Group concerning the status of the deployed SFODAs/SFODBs. Upon FOB deployment, augments the battalion AST sections and provides mission support to the SFODAs/SFODBs.

7. Company Headquarters, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). HHC loses its Assistant Operations NCO, 18B30/W7 (AC 1/03) to the MAROPS Facility and gains a Foreign Weapons Armorer, 18B30, to maintain and service all foreign weapons assigned to the battalion. The current Armorer, 76Y1P lacks the knowledge or training to maintain, service, or instruct soldiers in foreign weapons.

a. Foreign Weapons Armorer, E-6, 18B30, change in duty description from SFODA Weapons NCO to become the Foreign Weapons Armorer, responsible for maintaining, servicing, and providing instruction in the use of the battalion's foreign weapons. As the senior unit armorer, he assumes responsibility for the operation of the battalion arms room, including conventional and special purpose U. S. and foreign made weapons. He supervises the ordering and stockage of repair parts, service parts, and cleaning supplies.

8. Service Detachment Headquarters. The Service Detachment Headquarters is eliminated, with its functions picked up by either the SPTCEN or S-4 section under the battalion provisional organization. The Service Detachment Headquarters Commander assumes duties as the unit S-4 (S-4 assumes duties as the SPTCEN Director), responsible for the Rigger Air Delivery Section, Food Service Section, Maritime Operations Facility, Mechanical Maintenance Section, and the Supply and Transportation Section.

TO&E CHANGES MTOE, 31805LSP10

1. Command Section

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>ASI/LIC</u>
Chaplain	O-3	56A00	5P
Chaplain's Asst	E-4	71M1P	
RM Officer	O-3	45A/(18/45)	5P
RM NCO	E-5	75B2P	
OPCEN Director	O-4	18A00	
SPTCEN Director	O-4	92B00	5P
SIGCEN Director	O-4	25C00	5D,5M,5P, 4H

2. Operations Center (OPCEN): Covers S-3, S2/MID, PLANS, Civil Affairs, and NBC sections.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>ASI/LIC</u>
Operations Officer	W-4	180AO	
Operations SGM	E-9	18A00	CHANGE FM OPS NCO
Operations NCO	E-8	18A00	
AST	W-4	180AO	(3)
S-3 TNG AST	W-4	180AO	
Area Spec NCO	E-7	18E40	
Air Ops NCO	E-7	18F40	
Plans Officer	O-3	18A00	
Plans NCO	E-8	18Z50	
Asst Plans NCO	E-7	18F40	
LNO	O-3	18A00	(2)
LNO NCO	E-7	18B40	(2)
SPECAT FPO	E-7	18F40	
SPECAT Clerk	E-4	71L1P	
Civil Affairs OFC	O-3	39C00/(18/39)(2)	5P
Civil Affairs NCO	E-7	11B/18F405P	(2)
Military Policema.n	E-4	95B1P	(part of CA Team)
SIGINT Analyst	E-5	98C2P	(change in grade)
SSO	E-6	96B3P	
Asst SSO	E-5	96B2P	

3. Support Center (SPTCEN). Includes S-1, S-4, PBO, Food Service, ~~FAF OPS~~, Rigger/Aerial Delivery and Medical sections.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>ASI/LIC</u>
SPTCEN SGM	E-9	76Z50	Fm Detachment SGT
Parachute Packer	E-3	43E1P	(5) Increase in strength

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>ASI/LIC</u>
Auto Repairman	E-4	63W1P	(2) (Replaces E-4 62B1P and E-4 63S1P)
Maritime Ops Fac Dir	W-4	180A4W	
Maritime Ops Fac NCOIC	E-8	18Z50/S6	
Open Circuit Supv	E-7	18D40/S6	
Closed Circuit Supv	E-7	18D40/S6	
Closed Circuit Tech	E-6	18B30/W7	
Boat Center Supervisor	E-6	18C30	
Boat Tech	E-5	43M2P	
Outboard Motor Supv	E-5	88L2P	
PLL Clerk	E-5	76C2P	
Medical NCO	E-7	18D405P	Increase in Grade.
Preventive Med NCO	E-6	18D305P	Change in MOS
Medical Supply NCO	E-5	76J2P	
Medical Officer	O-3	67B005P	

4. Signal Center (SIGCEN). Includes C-E, and Signal Detachment.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>ASI/LIC</u>
Area Communications Chief	E-8	31Z5P	(Upgrade and reclass fm 106-01 Commo NCO, E-7 18E40)
Spec Elect Dev Rep	E-5	39E2P	
Cryptofac Custodian	E-6	74C3P	Requires TS/SBI
Alt Crypto Fac Cust	E-5	74C2P	Requires TS/SBI
Crypto Rep SGT	E-5	29S2P	Requires TS/SBI
ADP NCOIC	E-7	74F4P	
ADP NCO	E-6	74F3P	
Radio NCOIC	E-6	31C3P	needed for new equipment.
Radio Oper	E-4	31C1P	
Multich NCO	E-5	31M2P	
Multich Oper	E-4	31M1P	
Senior Rdo Oper	E-5	31C2P	Part of SSO Comm Tm (TS/SBI Required)
Single Ch Rdo Oper	E-4	31C1P	Part of SSO Comm Tm (TS/SBI Required)

Single Ch Rdo Oper

E-4

31C1P Part of SSO Comm Tm,
increase of 1 operator(TS/SBI Required)

5. Structure for the TDA Communications Center

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>ASI/LIC</u>
COMM CEN NCOIC	E-6	74C30	
COMM CEN SGT	E-5	74C20	
COMM CEN OPR	E-4	74C10	


6. SPECIAL FORCES COMPANIES

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>ASI/LIC</u>
Clerk Typist	E-4	71L1P	(1 per company)
AST	E-7	18F40	(2 per company)
ENGR	E-7	18C40	(1 per company)


7. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>ASI/LIC</u>
Foreign Weapons Armorer	E-6	18B30	

Command Group




OPERATIONS CENTER




Tab B to ANNEX C

SUPPORT CENTER




Tab C to ANNEX C

SIGNAL CENTER




Tab D to ANNEX C

SPECIAL FORCES COMPANY "B" DETACHMENT



Tab E to ANNEX C

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS



Tab F to ANNEX C

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